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ABSTRACT
MCKoy,   Shahera  Diane;  M.S,;  Department  of  Agribusiness  and  Applied  Economics;
College   of  Agriculture,   Food   Systems,   and  Natural   Resources;  North  Dakota   State
University;  December 2007.  The  Impact  of Multilateral  Trade  Association  Membership
on Agricultural and Food Trade. Major Professor: Dr. David Lambert.
This   thesis   models   trade   flows   between   countries   as   a   function   of  several
variables,   including   those   representing   membership   in   multilateral   trade   agreements
(MTAs).  The objective of this research is to evaluate the impact of trade policies, trading
costs,  trade  agreements  and  other  demographic  characteristics  on  exports  of food  and
agriculture  products.  More  specifically,  the  paper uses  a gravity  model  augmented  with
three  sets  of dummy variables to  estimate the  impact  of 13  trade  arrangements  on  intra-
bloc and extra-bloc trade.   Results indicate that several MTAs enhance intra-bloc trading
at  the  expense  of non-members  while  others  have  been  successful  at  increasing  both
intra-bloc trade and trade with the rest of the world. Findings further suggest that several
arrangements had no significant effect on member trading and that a few have effectively
reduced trade for members.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, international trade has increased as a result of reduced trade barriers
and  the  global  diffusion  of  production  technologies.   For  small  economies,  changes  in
international  markets  pose  numerous  challenges  and  opportunities.  Richard  Bemal,  in  his
paper presented  at a  World  Bank  Conference  in  July  2001,  outlined the  characteristics  of
small  developing  economies  as  follows:   high  degree  of  openness,   limited  diversity  in
economic  activity,  export  concentration  on  one  to  three products,  small  size  of firms  and
significant dependency on trade taxes.  For example,  in some countries of the Organization
of Eastern Caribbean States, international trade taxes account for 60 percent of government
revenues  (Ocampo  2002).  These  characteristics  increase a small  country's vulnerability to
exogenous  shocks,  constrain  their  ability  to  compete  and  limit  their  adjustment  capacity
(Bemal  2001).  Without trade,  small  economies do  not enjoy economies of scale or scope,
limiting needed technological  advancement  that will  improve  their  competitiveness.    This
is  exasperated  by  their  restricted  access  to  financial  capital  and  extema[  resources  since
investments  in  these  small  economies  are  considered  risky  by  many  financial  institutions
and  private  investment  firms.  On  the  other hand,  the  sizes  of these  small  economies  may
potentially  allow  them  to  achieve  greater  social  cohesion,  which  may  promote  economic
growth  and  improve  the  investment  climate  within  that  economy  (Ocampo  2002).     In
addition, a smaller population may promote better access to essential information needed to
foster cooperation in development activities.
Trade   liberalization  has   forced  many   small   economies  to   engage   in   unilateral
reforms.  Many  of their  fiscal  policies  are  now  geared  towards  reducing  reliance  on  trade
taxes  and  developing  domestic  financial  markets  that  will  create  access  to  resources  for
export companies.  There have also been moves to develop strategic  alliances among  small
economies  with  the  aim  of improving  competitiveness  and  technological  linkages.  Small
economies  can  no  longer  stand  alone  and  hope  to  wade  through  trade  liberalization  as
individual nations. Many decision makers in these small countries are cognizant of the need
for  regional  and  sub-regional  integration  to  promote  joint  marketing  ventures,  common
financial  services and improved cooperation in research and development (Ocampo 2002).
The   success  of  the   smaller  economies  will   hinge   on  their  ability  to   adjust  and  take
advantage  of the opportunities offered by their small  size.  The task ahead will  be  difflcult
but  many  small  country  decision  makers  have  recognized  their  plight  and  have  made
provisions via "special and differential treatment."
In  addition  to  these  initiatives  by  many  small  countries,  the  Doha  Round  of the
WTO was initiated in November 2001  to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in
world   agricultural   markets,   with   the   specific   purpose   of   improving   welfare   in   the
developing world.  In this current round, trade ministers and/or trade representatives agreed
to 50 provisions that clarified the obligations of developing countries with respect to issues
relating to  agriculture,  clothing  and textile,  subsidies,  rules  of origin,  technical  barriers to
trade  and  trade-related  investment  measures.  Issues  of particular  importance  were  those
highlighted  in the  Agreement  on  Agriculture  reached  at  the  end  of the  Uruguay  round  in
1994.     Under  the  Doha  round,  member  governments  pledged  commitments  relating  to
market  access,  export  subsidies  and  domestic   supports  for  the  agriculture   sector.   The
following   sentence   from   the   declaration   signed   at  the   Doha  Ministerial   indicates  the
commitment of member governments:
"Building  on the  work  carried  out  to  date  and  without  prejudging  the  outcome  of
the  negotiations  we  commit  ourselves  to  comprehensive  negotiations  aimed  at:
substantial  improvements  in  market  access;  reductions  of,  with  a view  of phasing
out,  all  forms  of  export  subsidies;  and  substantial  reductions  in  trade-distorting
domestic supports." (WTO Ministerial Declaration November 2001 )
Negotiations during the Doha round focused on setting phase-out periods and other
deadlines for the removal of trade barriers.  It highlighted actions to be taken by all parties,
i.e.,  developed,  developing  and  least  developed  countries  in  order  to  reduce  Amber  box[
programs  and  accomplish  welfare  gains.  Developed  countries  agreed  to  cut  amber  box
spending   by   20   percent   in  total   spending   over   six   years   while   developing   countries
committed to cut amber box spending by  13.3 percent over ten years (Beierle 2001). Under
the   special   and  differential   treatment  clause,   developing  countries   are   allowed   longer
phase-out periods to minimize potential negative shocks from reduction in supports to their
agricultural sector. This affords small countries time to develop production efficiencies and
to determine areas in which they may have comparative advantage.
Liberalizing  trade  on  all  commodities  and  eliminating  agricultural  subsidies  are
estimated to  lead  to  welfare  improvements of $300  billion a year by  2015  (Anderson and
Martin   2005).    Welfare    improvements   would   be   shared   disproportionately   between
`  All domestic  support measures considered to distort production  and trade (with a few exceptions) fall  into
the  WTO Amber box.  These  include measures to support prices or subsidies directly related to production
quantities.  Other boxes include the blue box and the green box.  The blue box also  includes support measures
that may distort production and trade but have a production  limiting component.  The green box includes
those measures that are not trade distorting.
developing  and  developed  countries.  Developing  countries  may  enjoy  45  percent  of the
global  gains,  a disproportionate  gain  given their current  20  percent  share  of global  Gross
Domestic   Product.   Developing   countries'    welfare   (through   efficiency   gains)   would
increase by  1.2 percent as compared to a 0.6 percent increase for developed countries. The
welfare  gains  from  liberalization  would  be  shared  by  both  consumers  and  producers.
Consumers  will  have  access  to  a wider array  of goods  at  lower prices  and producers  will
have  access  to   imported  inputs   and  foreign  markets.   Increased   competition   promotes
greater efflciency and productivity  resulting  in lower cost production and  lower prices  for
consumers.  The  potential  gains to  developing countries  from complete trade  liberalization
would  be  attributed  to  domestic  reforms  and  the  reduction  of high  tariffs  faced  by  their
exporters/producers  when  entering  developed  country  markets.  Unilateral  reforms  would
involve  the  development  of domestic  economic  policies  that  encourage  the  allocation  of
resources  to   more  productive   activities.   The   special   and   differential   treatment   clause
affords   developing   countries   different   timetables,   different  target   reduction   rates   and
different  exemptions,  to  promote  their  economic  well-being  and  food  security.  Although
this  is  intended  to  negate  negative  consequences  of liberalization,  Anderson  and  Martin
(2005) cited that developing and least de'veloped countries would realize more gains if they
relinquish some of their claims to special and differential treatment.
Need for Study
Agricultural trade policies  supporting trade liberalization have far reaching impacts
on  developing  countries  since  agricultural  earnings  are  important  contributors  to  current
welfare  and  economic  development.  This  is  of course  true  for  all  sectors  if trade  policies
restrict market access by diverting income to larger nations.  In particular, those developing
countries that are not members of major trading blocks do not enjoy the associated beneflts
and  are  therefore  disadvantaged  by  trade  restrictions  that  may  impede  their  ability  to
expand  exports to  larger markets,  effectively  reducing  foreign  exchange  earnings,  current
account  surplus  and  GDP.  The  impediments  to  export  expansion  must  be  analyzed  to
determine  losses  experienced  by  small  countries  that  have  traditionally  received  most  of
their foreign exchange from agricultural commodities. Market access has been restricted by
tariffs  and  non-tariff  measures  including  export  subsidies,  domestic  supports  and  other
protective farm policies in developed nations.  Exporters from developing countries face an
average tariff of 16 percent for agriculture and food, 9 percent for clothing and textiles and
2.5  percent for other manufactured  goods  (Anderson and Martin 2005).  The average tariff
on agricultural goods is high both in high-income countries and developing countries.
Although   strides   have   been   made   to   reduce   subsidies   under  the   WTO,   some
developed  countries  still  find ways  to  circumvent amber box  regulations.  The  problem  of
market access is further compounded where trade agreements offer advantages to member
countries  by  reducing  or  eliminating  tariffs  and  other  barriers  for  them,  while  restricting
access  to  non-members.  Exports  of those  regions  or  countries  excluded  from  Free  Trade
Agreements are  usually  diverted to  the  countries that are parties to  the  agreement.  Central
American  and  Caribbean  countries  experienced  such trade  diversion  when  NAFTA  came
into effect in  1994 since Mexican products were granted duty free access to the US market.
The  imposition  of  Rules  of  Origin  under  NAFTA  further  encourages  trade  diversion.
Although   Lederman,   Maloney   and   Serven   (2005)   did   not   find   significant   effects   of
NAFTA  on  the  trade  flows  of non-member  countries,  they  did  assert  that  the  gradual
reduction of tariffs envisioned by the treaty and the short amount of time that had elapsed
since  NAFTA's  inception  posed  difficulties  in  their  assessment.  It  is  clear  that  welfare
gains   from   liberalization   for   developing   nations   will   only   be   realized   if  all   market
distortions are eliminated.
Objectives
There  are  many  trade  policies  and  practices  that  have  limited  access  to  world
markets  by  restricting  trade.  Trade  agreements  have  also  impacted  trade  flows  between
countries.   The objective of this research is to evaluate the impact of trade policies, trading
costs,  trade agreements  and other economic  and demographic characteristics on exports of
food and  agriculture products.  An  additional  objective  is to  determine the  regional  effects
of trade  barriers  and  trade  agreements  on  regions  such  as  Central  America.  Individual
countries  and/or  regions  excluded  from  preferential  agreements  may  experience  limited
market  access   reducing   their   exports   of  agricultural   and   food  products,   leading  to   a
reduction in export earnings and consequently a reduction in income.
Organization
Chapter  2  discusses  previous  studies  related  to  trade  models  used  to  evaluate  the
determinants  of bilateral  trade  flows,  highlighting  previous  studies  done  in  the  areas  of

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
ln  recent  years  the  world  has  seen  a  continuous  increase  in  the  level   of  trade
amongst nations.  Much research has evaluated trade flows between countries.  Researchers
have  used  the  gravity  model  or  its  variations  to  estimate  relationships  between  trade  and
distance, market size, border effects and other explanatory variables.  Past findings indicate
that  distance  is  a  major  determinant  of bilateral  trade  since  countries  are  more  likely  to
trade with others in near geographic proximity instead of those further away.  Other factors,
such  as  market  size,  trade  policies,  and  per  capita  incomes,  have  been  found  to  either
promote or distort trade.  Furthermore, the significance of variables may vary depending on
the  sector  under  analysis.  Both  resource-based  factors  and  gravity  model  variables  are
known to impact trade amongst countries.
Trade Models
Jar  Tinbergen  (1962)  applied the  gravity  model  to  international  trade  flows  citing
that exchanges  between  countries  would  follow the  same  functional  form  as  other gravity
models.  The gravity model of trade specifies the value of trade between two countries as a
positive  function  of their  incomes  and  a  negative  function  of the  distance  between  them
(Thursby  and  Thursby  1987).  Since  the  early  1900s,  the  gravity  model  has  had  empirical
success in explaining many different types of flows.  The gravity model  specifles that flow
from  origin  i  to  destination j  can  be  explained  by  economic  forces  at  the  origin,  at  the
destination,   and   economic   forces  that  either   aid  or  inhibit  movement   from  origin  to
destination.    (Bergstrand     1985).    The    simplest    gravity-type    model    stems    from    a
rearrangement  of the  Cobb  Douglas  expenditure  function,  using  the  assumption  that  each
country  specializes  in  producing  its  own  good  (there  is  one  good  for  each  country  in  the
simple  model)  and  that  there  are  no  transport  costs  or  tariffs  (Anderson  1979).  Standard
forms of the gravity model have been criticized for their lack of theoretical foundation and
many  attempts have  been made to  expand the  simple  form  to  give  it more  empirical  and
theoretical  weight.  Anderson  (1979)  sought  to  provide  a  theoretical  explanation  for  the
gravity  equation  by  applying  a  trade-share  expenditure  system  model.   He  derived  the
gravity   equation   from   the   properties   of  expenditure   systems   using   the   non-income
dependent   expenditure   shares   as   the   most   relevant   variables.   This   system   provides
legitimacy to the gravity model and increases its efficiency properties in estimation.
In  addition to distance and wealth,  Ciuriak and Kinjo (2005) hypothesized that this
level  of trade  is also  impacted by commonalities between the  countries trading.  However,
they   cited  a  criticism  of  the   gravity  model   as  not  taking   into  account  the  theory  of
comparative advantage, particularly when the model is used to address policy applications.
Although  the  standard  gravity  model  provides  useful  inferences  about  intemational  trade
flows,  variations  of this  model  exist  to  take  into  account  other  variables  of significance.
Ciuriak and  Kinjo  used the  Trade  Specialization  Index which accounts  for a country's  net
exports in a specific sector, to account for comparative advantage between trading partners.
Bergstrand ( 1985) attempted to derive a generalized gravity equation from a general
equilibrium world trade model,  while  evaluating  whether the typical  gravity  equation was
misspecified.   Results of this study indicated that the typical gravity equation that excludes
price and exchange rate variables can not be explicitly derived from the theoretical model.
In cases where aggregate trade flows are differentiated by national origin,  omitting certain
price   variables   leads   to   misspecification   of  the   model.         Harris   and   Matyas   (1998)
conducted a comparison  of the  common fixed effect gravity model  and the  less  common
random effect counterpart.  They refined the estimation by accounting for simultaneity, and
by  clearly  specifying  the  source,  target  and  business  cycles  involved.  HaITis  and  Matyas
believed  that  using  panel  data  would  account  for  heterogeneity  in  the  model  and  would
capture  time  effects  which  significantly  affect  bilateral  trade  flows.  They  contended  that
ignoring these effects would lead to a misspecified econometric model.
The   use    of   gravity-type   models   remains   popular.    Although   the   theoretical
underpinning  for  this  model  has  been  questioned,   the  model   itself    continues  to   see
empirical   success   as  researchers   create   variations  to   address   changes   in   world  trade.
Bergstrand ( 1989) tied the gravity equation with models of inter-industry and intra-industry
trade. This study expanded upon Bergstrand's  1985 paper by applying differences in factor
endowment to the generalized gravity model. This study along with others has incorporated
features that will  account for comparative advantage and other variables not accounted  for
by the typical gravity equation. Feenstra et al.  (2001) stated that the theoretical foundations
for the  gravity equation  are  quite  general,  but the  empirical  performance  is  quite  specific.
They   derived   gravity   equations   for   both   differentiated   and   homogenous   goods   using
Rauch' s measure of homogenous versus differentiated goods to separate their samples. The
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authors  contended  that  gravity  equations  can  be  used  to  distinguish  amongst  different
theoretical models.  Through their study they proved that this argument is valid and that the
theories  determined  varying  home  market  effects.    The  gravity  model  has  been  used  in
conjunction  with  other  trade  models  and  this  flexibility  has  increased  its  acceptance  in
empirical work.
One  important  variable  in  all  gravity-type  models  is  distance.  This  variable  has
always been included as a factor that affects trade between origin and destination countries
since  it  has  been  theorized  that  transport  cost  are  increasing  in  distance.  The  amount  of
trade  taking  place  between  two  countries  that  are  5,000  miles  apat will  be  20  percent  of
the  amount  of  trade  predicted  to  take  place  if  those  countries  were   1,000  miles  apart
(Ghemawat  2001).    Ghemawat  also  expanded  the  definition  of distance  to  include  four
dimensions:  administrative,  cultural,  economic  and  geographic.  Administrative  distance
refers   to   political   and   historical   associations   such   as   colonial   relationships.   Cultural
distance  relates  to  the  cultural  attributes  of a country's  population  and affects consumer's
preference  which  in  turn  will  determine  what  is  demanded  in  the  destination  country.
Geographic distance affects transportation and communication costs that are incurred when
trading. This becomes very significant when markets are not proximate. Economic distance
refers  to  the  disparity  in  wealth  or  income  among  consumers  in  trading  countries.  This
determines both the  level  of trade and the type of trade partners.  Although other variables
have been  added to trade models over time,  distance still remains an important variable in
explaining  international  trade.  Berthelon  and  Freund  (2004)  concluded  that  distance  has
become  more  significant  in trade models  since  1980  due to  increasing distance  sensitivity
in 25  percent of industries included in their study. The results of their study further suggest
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that  while  distance  related  trade  costs  remain  unchanged  for  most  industries,  there  have
been  shifts  in  support  of contiguous  markets  for  some  industries.    In  a  study  comparing
homogenous and differentiated goods, Rauch (1999) looked at the effects of proximity and
common  language/colonial   ties  on  trade  between  international   buyers   and  sellers.   He
concluded  that  other  trade   costs  relating  to   accessing   information   about   international
markets and finding trade partners are also likely to reduce distant trade.
Agricultural Trade
Agricultural    trade    liberalization    has    significant    implications    for    developing
countries.  Both the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations have
focused  on  agriculture  and  potential  welfare  losses  and  gains  to  smaller  countries.  Many
researchers have  addressed the trade  disparities that exist and the resulting implications to
poorer nations. However, Hertel et al.  (2001) describe analytical procedures assessing such
impacts  as  rudimentary  since  when  dealing  with  multi-country  analysis,  researchers  are
compelled  to   use  per  capita  effects   instead   of  detailed  household   data.  Nevertheless,
impacts  of domestic  supports,  tariffs  and  other protectionist  measures  have been  assessed
from  different  angles.  Hoekman,  Ng  and  Olarreaga  (2002)  evaluated  effects  of granting
duty  free  access  to  Least  Developed  Countries  (LDCs)  for  tariff  peaks  items  in  four
markets  (Canada,  the  European  Union,  Japan  and  the  United  States).  Simulation  results
showed that duty  free  access  increases exports  of LDCs by  approximately  $2.5  billion,  an
1 I  percent increase.  In this study, gains for LDCs translate into tosses for other developing
countries.  This  accentuates  that  for  every  action taken,  the  outcomes  may  differ  for  each
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stakeholder.  The ripple  effect from  all  trade  decisions may  lead to either trade creation or
trade  diversion.  The  outcome  is  determined  by  many  factors  including  but  not  limited  to
the  demand  and  supply  of the  commodity being  traded,  the  level  of domestic  support  for
this commodity in developed countries and the level of other non-tariff barriers erected.
Agricultural  trade  studies  have  historically  focused  on  poorer  countries  that  are
agriculture-driven and other countries where agriculture constitutes a substantial portion of
their export earnings.  These  include  Sub-Saharan Africa,  Latin America,  China,  India and
other developing  countries  and  LDCs  that  are  highly  dependent  on  exports  or  imports  of
agricultural  commodities.  Countries less dependent on agriculture have not received much
attention in agricultural trade research.  This paper will  look specifically at regional effects
and welfare implications stemming from liberalized agricultural trade and multilateral trade
associations  (MTAs).  The  share  of world  trade  taking  place  under  MTAs  has  increased
significantly.  Mexican exports to the United  States rose  from 78.8  percent of total  exports
in  1990 to 85.4 percent in  1997.  Intra-PTA trade among MERCOSUR members grew from
8.9 percent of total exports in  1990 to 24.4 percent in  1997 (WTO  1998). With the increase
in the number of MTAs, economists have questioned whether they are trade-liberalizing or
protectionist and there have been many attempts to quantify MTA effects on both members
and  non-members.  Lederman,  Maloney  and  Serven  (2005)  used  a  gravity  approach  in  an
attempt  to  examine  the  effects  of  NAFTA  on  trade  flows  of  non-member  countries,
particularly  Caribbean  and  Central  American  countries.  This  task  proved  difficult  since
there  are  many  non-constant  exogenous  trade  factors  that  may  have  influenced  changes
during the time period they analyzed. Although Caribbean and Central American countries
are  concerned  about  potential  welfare  losses  from  trade  diversion  to  Mexico,  the  data
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implies that NAFTA had no  adverse effects  on non-member trading.  However, the overall
flndings were  inconsistent,  citing no  significant changes on trade  flows  from non-member
countries, while indicating that there may be trade diversion at the sectoral level. Given the
time   that  has   elapsed   since   NAFTA's   inception   in   1994   and   the   volatility   of  trade
determinants   since   then,   findings   from   studies   on   NAFTA's   trade   impacts   must   be
evaluated  with  discretion.  Krueger  (1999)  also  echoed  this  sentiment,  citing  that  most  of
the Preferential  Trade Agreements  studied only have data for a few years and those years
are often within the transitional period where new regulations are being phased in.
Although most of the studies on NAFTA have found evidence of trade creation and
none  of  trade   diversion,   there   are  other  agreements  where   trade   diversion  is   a  huge
possibility.  There  is  no  strong  evidence  to  support  the  claim  that  a  MTA  will  be  trade
creating  or  that  all  members  will  benefit  (World  Bank  2005).  The  World  Bank  in  their
Global Economic Prospects 2005 cited that while many developing countries have reduced
tariffs,  they  remain  high  in  many  regions  so  potential  trade  diversion  is  still  signiflcant.
Yeats  (1998)  concluded  that  most  of the  intra-MERCOSUR  trade  between  1988  to  1994
resulted from trade diversion from low cost members to higher cost MERCOSUR sources.
Yeats  found  that  many  domestic  producers  in  MERCOSUR  redirected  exports  to  local
markets reducing potential exports of third countries.  Soloaga and Winters (2000) applied a
gravity   model   to   annual   non-fuel   imports   data  for   58   countries   using   dummies  that
reflected  intra-bloc  trade  and  members'  total  exports  and  imports  separately.  While  they
found no  significant boost in intra-bloc trade for any of the PTAs  in their estimation, they
did   notice   a   positive   trend   on   the   coefficients   on   overall   imports   for   CACM   and
MERCOSUR. Their results also indicated evidence of trade diversion within the European
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Union.  Using  a  gravity  model,  Clarete,  Edmonds  and  Wallack  (2002)  outlined  the  major
PTAs  in  Asia  and  other  regions  and  reviewed  trends  in  trade  flows  within  the  various
arrangements. They found that the ANDEAN Pact, MERCOSUR and SPARTECA tend to
expand trade among members at the expense of imports from the rest of the world. The EU
was  found  to  expand  member  trade  without  negatively  affecting  external  trade   while
NAFTA has not changed intra-bloc trade but reduced trade with the world. There have also
been studies that evaluate whether PTAs increase protectionism. Knieger ( 1999) stated that
all PTAs are not created equal, citing the differences between EU's trade liberalization and
MERCOSUR's trade diversion. Foroutan (1998) explored the nature of the relationship that
existed between a country's participation in a PTA and the restrictiveness of that country's
trade.  This  study found that Latin American countries that are members of a PTA are also
those  that  have  liberalized  the  most.   In  concluding,  however,  Foroutan  noted  that  the
acceptance of a liberal trade policy supersedes membership in a PTA and that belonging to
a  regional  bloc  constitutes  neither  a  necessary  nor  sufficient  condition  for  an  open  and
liberal trade regime.
Trade  agreements  that  support  comprehensive  trade  liberalization  across  all  key
sectors  and  nonrestrictive  rules  of origin  are  more  likely  to  realize  success  (World  Bank
GEP  2005).  Many  researchers  recognize  that  PTA's  can  either  be  trade  creating  or trade
diverting and individual assessment must be conducted to determine effects on trade flows.
In  reassessing  the  implications  of  NAFTA  and  other  trading  arrangements  on  regions
including  Central  American nations,  this  study  will  allow for  a mechanism  to  control  for
exogenous  factors  in  the  model  and  will  deal  specifically  with  the  agriculture  and  food
sectors. It is expected that sector level evaluation will yield more conclusive results.
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Methodolo ies of Previous Research
Different  versions  of  general  and  partial  equilibrium  models,   as  well  as  other
formulations,   have   been   used   to   quantify   the   effect   of  liberalization   on   agriculture-
dependent nations.  Martin and  Brandao  (1993)  used  various types  of partial  liberalization
to   assess  the   impacts   from   liberalization  by  developed  countries  only,   by  developing
countries only and by both developing and developed countries using a general equilibrium
framework  (RUNS   Model).   The   paper   focused  on   agricultural   trade   liberalization  as
opposed  to  liberalization  of  agricultural  policies.  Assessing  the  impact  of  each  partial
liberalization   highlighted   the   effects   of   each   scenario   on   developing   nations   and
consequently on welfare.  Messerlin (2005) cited that the priority of the Doha round should
be substantial tariff reduction and used the  Swiss formula as a tool to reduce dispersion of
tariff rates  creating  a  uniform  tariff.     The  Swiss  formula  incorporated  three  maximum
tariffs,  a  low tariff for developed countries,  a higher tariff for LDCs  and an intermediate
one  for other countries.  Messerlin  views  high  tariffs  as  the  main  instrument of protection
imposed by developing countries on  imports and reduction thereof will  lead to  gains from
trade  between  developing countries.  Van  der  Mensbrugge  and  Beghin  (2004)  also  used  a
general  equilibrium model  to  quantify potential  gains  from  agricultural  trade  reform.  The
global   LINKAGE  model  was  used  to  assess  impacts  of  agricultural  trade  and  support
policies  on  global  trade,   income  and  output  patterns,  using  baseline  simulation  and  a
reform  simulation.  The  simulations  identify  the  share  of total  gains  derived  from  both
industrial  countries'  and  developing  countries'  reform.  They  also  determine  the  share  of
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gains driven by reform to border protection measures and those driven by reform relating to
domestic supports.
Hertel,  Dimaranan  and  Keeney  (2003)  look  specifically  at  the  effects  of  OECD
domestic  supports  on  developing  countries.  They  use  a  restructured  GTAP  database  and
model,   using   four   classifications   of   domestic   supports,   i.e.   input   subsidies,   output
subsidies,  land-based payments and capital based payments.  Five simulations were used to
assess the impacts of changes in OECD domestic  support on developing countries.  This  is
done  by  systematically  adjusting domestic  supports by various percentages and by  sectors
and then measuring the outcomes.  Hertel et al.  (2001) attempted to quantify the impacts of
multilateral  trade  liberalization  on  poverty  by  using  a  cross-section  consumption  analysis
and earnings data from household surveys in  seven countries.  This  approach went beyond
country  per  capita  effects  and  assessed  trade  policies  on  households  by  computing  the
change in household income.
Previous Findin
Martin  and  Bradoa  (1993)    measured  welfare  effects  by  terms  of trade  impacts,
efficiency gains from liberalization and second-best effects manifested in induced changes
in tariff revenues. They found that if only the OECD countries liberalize,  some developing
countries  experience  losses.  As  a  group,  however,  a  small  gain  of  US$629  million  is
realized.  Under  global  liberalization,  gains  for developing  countries  increase  considerably
in  relation  to  gains  realized  by  OECD  countries.  The  net  gain  of developing  countries  in
this   scenario   is  US$59   billion.   Overall   results   indicate   that  most  gains  to   developing
countries   come   from   domestic   reforms,   the   net   gain   being   US$56   billion.   This   is
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highlighted   by   the   results   of  the   scenario   that   considers   only   the   liberalization   of
developing countries.  Even those developing countries that experience losses under global
liberalization  would  experience  gain  under  this  scenario.  Messerlin  (2005)  cited  similar
results,   indicating   that   a   country's   welfare   gains   will   come   mainly   from   unilateral
liberalization.  This proved true for both developing and OECD  countries.  They added that
developing  countries  would  gain  considerably  from  OECD  agricultural  liberalization  as
well.  According to  Francois,  Meijl,  and Tongeren  (2003),  agricultural  liberalization offers
mixed results citing that domestic support liberalization in OECD is positive for the OECD
countries  but  produces  negative  consequences  for  some  other  countries,  particularly  for
Sub-Saharan  Africa.  They  found  that  gains  are  usually  related  to  relaxation  of domestic
supports while elimination of border measures yields mixed results.
Van der Mensbrugghe and Beghin (2004) estimated that agriculture and food trade
reforms  provide   70   percent  of  total   gains   from   trade  reform,   or   $265   billion  of  the
estimated   $385   billion   in  welfare   improvements.   While   the   gains   were   found   to   be
distributed   equally   between   industrial   and   developing   countries.   developing   countries
gained  more  as  a  share  of initial  income.  They  also  found that  developing  countries  gain
more  from  unilateral  reforms  than  from  increased  market  access  in  developed  countries.
Industrial   countries  also  gain  more  from  national  reforms.  Van  der  Mensbrugghe  and
Beghin established that the main determinants in the overall level of welfare gains are trade
elasticities.  Anderson (2000) made a similar but somewhat distinct conclusion as it related
to  agriculture  liberalization  in  OECD  countries.  Data  collected  in  this  study  suggest  that
about 48  percent of global welfare gains would result from agriculture and food reform in
OECD countries, even though such commodities only account for 4 percent of global GDP.
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This  represents  almost half of the  global  gains.  Anderson  concluded that export  subsidies
should  be  banned  completely  to  bring  agriculture  in  line  with  other  products  under  the
GATT,   considering  that  other  authors  only  mentioned   successive  reduction  of  export
subsidies without    alluding to export subsidy elimination.
Concluding Remarks on Agricultural Trade
Agricultural  trade  liberalization  has  been  given  much  attentiono  mainly  due  to
potential  welfare  gains  for  developing  and  underdeveloped  nations.  Many  studies  have
extracted data relating to  specific economies and have used various versions of partial  and
general   equilibrium   models   along   with   other   analytical   formulas   to   quantify   effects.
Employing an approach that combined national household surveys, the ICP database on per
ccapita  consumption,  the  Deninger  and  Squire  Income  distribution  data  set  and  the  GTAP
database.  Hertel  et  al.  (2001 )  used  measures  of compensating  and  equivalent  variation  to
evaluate welfare  gains.  They found that marginal  households in the agriculture sector gain
in all but one of the regions they were evaluating as a result of increased world food prices
and the consequent increased returns to agriculture.  This,  again, highlights the dependency
of  marginalized   economies   on   agricultural   trade.   In   reviewing   related   literature,   the
consensus appears to be that multilateral trade liberalization will cause substantial gains for
impoverished  and  developing  countries.  More  important  though  are  the  increased  gains
resulting  from  unilateral  reforms.  Hoekman.  0larreaga  and  Ng  (2002)  cited that domestic
distortions  and  other  institutional  weaknesses  act  as  major  constricting  factors  to  LDC's
export  expansion.  It  is,  therefore,  important  that  countries  recognize  those  factors  that
impede  trade  expansion  so  that they  can  implement  reform  measures.  The  assessment  of
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the  Central  American  countries  in  this  study  will  possibly  disclose  potential  distortions
within   national   boundaries   to   mitigate   their   influence   before   addressing   the   welfare
implications  of global  agricultural  trade  liberalization.  Given  the  literature  on  this  topic,
one  thing  appears  certain:  whatever  the  implications,  partial  liberalization  will  lead  to
greater   welfare   gains   than   no   liberalization   (Somwam   and   Skully   2005).   Without
liberalization,  many countries will  validate their protectionist policies  and  erect additional
barriers  to  trade.  In  such  a  scenario,  the  survival  of the  fittest  nation  may  drive  poorer
countries further into poverty.
Food Trade
Over the years, there have been major changes in global food trade stemming from
changes   in   the   production   and   consumption   of  food   worldwide.      The   adoption   of
production   technology   in   the   food   industry   has   been   influenced   by   research   and
development,  the  supply of raw materials,  disposable  income  and other economic  factors,
food habits, health and nutrition, and other market conditions (Edelman and Fewell  1985).
Trade  in  food  is  affected  by  supply  side  factors  such  as  relative  growth  in  factors  of
production and demand-driven factors  such as growth in disposable  income  and change  in
consumer preferences (Regmi 2001).   These changes have shifted the composition of world
agricultural   trade   in  terms   of  both   food   and  non-food   commodities   in  either  raw  or
processed   form.   Gehlhar   and   Coyle   (2001)   categorized   agricultural   trade   into   four
components:    bulk   commodities,    processed   intermediate   products,    fresh   horticulture
products  and  processed  consumer  goods.  In  the  past,  bulk  commodities  including  grains
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accounted for a large percentage of total agricultural trade.  With improvements in shipping
technology, the world has  seen trade expansion in fresh produce.  In winter Americans can
now purchase fresh grapes from Chile, oranges from Australia, snow peas from Guatemala
and  almost  any  other  produce  all  year  long  (Regmi  2001).  However,  many  of the  fastest
growing  categories  in  trade  are  packaged  products  (Gehlhar  and  Coyle  2001).  Pastry,
chocolates  and  other  prepared  foods  accounted  for  $15  billion  in  world  trade2  in  2001,
while  wine  accounted  for  $7.4  billion,  exhibiting  a  growth  rate  of 6  percent  per  annum.
Gehlar  and  Coyle  broke  down  the  determinants  of food  trade  into  factor  growth  on  the
supply side, income growth on the demand side, and barriers to trade.
Demand-Driven Factors
Food in general is considered to be a normal good with a positive income elasticity
of demand.   However, according to Engel's law,  food's share of total  expenditure declines
as  income  increases.  This  is  more  evident  in  higher  income  economies.  According  to
Cranfle[d et al.  (1998), countries with low per capita income are expected to see relatively
larger  growth  in  their  food  expenditure  than  countries  with  high  per  capita  expenditure
since  quantities  demanded  in  low  income  countries  increase  proportionately  more  with
income  growth than  in developed, higher income  countries.  In Cranfield's  study,  Ethiopia
had  the  most  responsive  food  demand  while  the  United  States  had  the  least  responsive
demand.  A  ten  percent  increase  in  per  capita  expenditure  in  Ethiopia  resulted  in  a  9.7
percent   increase   in   food   demand,   while   the   same   ten  percent   increase   in   per  capita
expenditure  in  the  United  States  resulted  in  a  I.5  percent  increase  in  food  demand.  For
those economies where food supply is of great concern, food consumption will be primarily
2  World Trade  in this context does not include trade among members of the  European Union.
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affected  by  income.   In  such  instances,  changes  in  income  may  be  the  primary  factor
contributing to  changes  in food consumption.  For higher income  economies,  consumption
patterns   may   also   be   affected   by   other   lifestyle   changes   and   changes   in   consumer
preferences. Import demand will therefore be influenced by the consumer' s requirement for
palatable, safe and nutritious foods that are convenient, readily available and provide value
for money (Edelman and Fewell  1985).
Shifts  in  the  consumption  of food  types  may  drastically  impact  food  trade.  With
increased   disposable   income,   countries   may   demand   foreign   brands   of  food   items,
changing the  composition  of total  domestic  consumption.  This will  lead  to  an  increase  in
imports of food. However, in certain instances the demand for foreign varieties encourages
intra-industry trade since there is simultaneous exporting and importing of similar products
between trading partners (Gehlhar and Coyle 2001 ).
Driven Factors
Supply  side  factors  also  have  significant  impact  on the  changing  trade  patterns  in
the  international  food industry.  Changes  in the relative abundance of primary  factors  such
as  land,  labor and  capital  determine  changes  in  production costs,  which  in turn affect the
level  of trade  (Gehlhar  and  Coyle  2001).  This  follows  from  the  Hecksher-Ohlin  model
which  states  that  countries  will  export  products  that  utilizes  their  abundant  factor(s)  of
production  and  will   import  products  that  utilizes  their  scarce  factor(s).   By   extension,
technological  growth  also  influences  trade  in  food.  Many  food  processing  facilities  must
invest  in  capital  upgrades  and  engage  in  capital  intensive  operations.  The  abundance  and
intensity   of  factors   therefore   determine   specialization   in   either   primary   or  processed
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products and indicate  whether countries are  net exporters or net  importers of the products
in  question.    However,  Gehlar  and  Coyle  (2001)  have  concluded  that  supply-side  effects
have  had  more  to  do  with  shifts  in  economy-wide  structure  rather  than  compositional
changes in trade.
Concludin Remarks on Food Trade
Many    factors    have    contributed   to    the    changing    structure    of   global    food
consumption  and  trade.  Coyle  et  al.  (1998)  found  that  demand,  driven  by  changes  in  per
capita   income   and   income   elasticities   is   the   most   significant   factor   affecting   food
consumption  patterns.   Others  like  Gehlhar  and  Coyle  (2001)  attributed  the  changes  to
demand side  factors,  supply-side factors and trade barriers.  Regmi  et al.  (2001 )  found that
both food budget share and income elasticity of food decline as  income  increases and that
lower  income   countries   spend   a  larger   share   of  their  budget   on   food   and   are   more
responsive  to  income  and  food  price  changes  than  middle  and  high-income  countries.
Regmi  (2001)  cited that  even though  income  increases  improved  food  purchasing  power,
overall  improvements  in trade  and transportation have  enhanced  selection and  availability
of food products.  Given past research  findings,  it is evident that there are combinations of
factors that affect food trade.   Although changing preferences and availability of food has
affected food consumption, the underlying factor is the consumer's ability to purchase food
which is determined by income.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND MODEL DEVELOPMHNT
This   chapter   presents   the   methods   and   data   used   to   analyze   determinants   of
agriculture and food trade. The review of literature outlines several factors proven to affect
trade  between  countries.  Variables  representing  income,  market  size,  distance,  historical
relationships  and  cultural  affinity  are  often  used  in trade  models.  A  combination  of these
factors detemines the level of production and consumption domestically and by extension
the expansion of markets beyond national borders.
While international trade deals with trade between countries instead of trade within
an  economy,  the  underlying  factors  remain  the  same.  Consumers  will  demand  products
subject to  prices and personal  income.  Producers will  supply products  subject to revenues
and costs.  Production decisions are also  guided by availability of resources.  In agriculture,
for example, the amount of arable land,  labor, and other inputs can all be varied to produce
different amounts of a specialized crop.
Specialization   is   the   basis   of  international   trade   (Vachal   1992).   Trade   allows
countries  to  focus  on  the  production  of certain  products  while  maintaining  a  variety  of`
products  for  consumption  (Koo  and  Kennedy  2005).  A  nation's  ability  to  specialize  is
associated with its resource endowment and production cost. To maximize export earnings,
countries  will  specialize  in those  goods  that they  can  produce  efficiently.  The  availability
of  resources   and   income   will   detemine   consumption   and   production   levels   on   the
consumption  possibilities  frontier  and  the  production  possibilities  frontier,  respectively.
Hence,  import  and  export  trade  will  be  determined  by  a  nation's  consumers  maximizing
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utility    and    producers    maximizing   profits,    subject    to    incomes    and    resource    cost,
respectively.
The Model
We develop a model that combines consumer food demand, food production and an
agricultural   sector   producing   raw   agricultural   products   used   in   food   manufacturing.
Consumption  occurs  in  every  country.  Production  of primary  and  processed  food  may
occur  in  any  country  depending  on  production  technologies.  Both  food  and  agricultural
intermediate goods may be traded.   We hypothesize that final demand, local characteristics
of  food   manufacturing,   trade   costs,   resource   endowments   and   relative   prices   in   the
agricultural   producing   countries   will   be   determinants   of  the   location   of   food   and
agricultural production and underlie observed trade flows.
Consumer Demand
Food  manufacturers  are   faced  with  the   following  inverse  demand   function   in
country !. (Feinberg and Keane 2003):
1,          P,--P,oQ;8,
where  P, and  Q,  represent  prices  and  quantities  of an  aggregate  food  good.    The  demand
intercepts,  P,o  , differ by country.  Exponent g, is the negative of the inverse price elasticity
of food demand in country J..
Demand  for  food  products  will  be  derived  from  consumers  maximizing  utility
subject to a budget constraint. The Marshallian demand function expresses the quantities of
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food  products  demanded by the  consumer  in terms  of food  prices  and  income.  Assuming
that the consumer is representative of the population,  total  demand will  be the sulnmation
of individual demands in country i.   The effects of income and population will be captured
in the  inverse  demand  function as  arguments  in the  demand  intercept,  where  P,o  =  P,o (in,
n), where in is income and n is population.
Food Manufacturing
Food   production   may   occur   in   any   country   S/.    Food   production   combines
purchased inputs, i/ ,  assumed to be non-traded, and intermediate agricultural inputs, 4 :
(2)         SI=_f]`'   (A],L).
The   agricultural   inputs   used   in   food   manufacturing   j4/   are   either   produced
domestically,  Jy,,,   or   are   imported   from   country   /,  jY/v.   Supplies   of  the   intermediate
agricultural  inputs used in food manufacturing in country /. cannot exceed local production
and imports:
(3)        AI=-I,X,I.
Food price  in country j. is dependent on total  sales,  0„  which in turn is determined
by those shipments from manufacturing country/. to fmal markets in country z...
(4)         Q,<-£JQJ,.
Food shipped from country of manufacturer/. cannot exceed production in/.,
(5)        S,=-I,QJ,.
Food manufacturing in country j  can be represented by an industry profit function.,
where  food  manufacturers  in  country  j   seek  to  maximize  profits  from  food  sales  in  all
markets ;..
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/6J        IT,= I, /P,o o,-8,Jg„w,J4,-w,££y-I,T„g„£,v,„j¥,„
Total  production  costs  are  incurred  in  each  of  the  countries  in  which   food  is
produced.  These  costs  are  dependent on  local prices  of raw  agricultural  inputs  w,  and the
cost  of purchased  inputs  w/i.  Costs  T„  represents  any  transportation  or  trading  costs  of
shipments   of  final   product   from   country  /.  to   markets   in   I.,   while   v/v  represents   any
transportation  or  trading  costs  of shipment  of raw  agricultural  inputs  used  in  production
imported from country / to country/..
ricultural Producti on
The raw agricultural input X/ may be produced in any country /  and is a function of
locally available fixed resources, D/,  and a purchased input, A4'/
(7)          Xi<_f iA(D],M)
Domestic  use  of agricultural  inputs  and  shipments  of agricultural  inputs  to  food
manufacturing plants in countryj. cannot exceed production
/8J        JY,2Z/X,/
The  agriculture  sector  is  assumed  to  be  perfectly  competitive,  represented  by  the
following profit maximization objective:
/9/         ||/  =w4XLrD/D/-rw/A4l/
The agricultural product carries the farm  gate value in country /.  All transportation
cost is borne by the  food  manufacturer, whether used domestically or in overseas markets.
Each agricultural industry is constrained by land availability.
/`°'        D/SDmax/
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Partial Equilibrium Model of the Food and Agricultural Sectors
To determine market clearing prices and quantities,level of trade, and resource use,
the partial equilibrium model of consumer demand and the food and agricultural production
sectors below is used:
(11)      Maximize f£,P,o QiJ-gi  -ZjwjLLj -£iLTjiQj[-LEI V|j x|j  -£|W|mMl
+ Zul hj] if j(Aj, L) -S) + Zul Aj2 ttxij -A) + I, hj3 ®Qj, -Q) + I jhj4 (Sj -£tQj)
+£[h[5Iff(D[,M)-X)+£i^f(Xi-Zj(I)+£|h](D[-D).
The first order conditions characterizing optimality of the above equation are listed
below.
/'2' aJa Q, =  (1-g,) P,o Q,-g'   _ A.3  <_  o
The marginal revenue of food quantity supplied  in market I. is less than or equal to
the  marginal  cost  of  supplying  food  to  the  market.  Assuming  an  interior  solution,  food
consumption in country j. occurs when marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
3)       @`@QJ ,--- TJl+A:-A)4=-0
If 0„ > 0  (i.e.  food is produced in country j  and  shipped to market i), the marginal
value of the  food to the importer in i is equal to the marginal cost of procuring the food  in
country j plus the cost of transportation from j to i.
(14)       6J6Sj=_hj]   +hj4<_o
The marginal  value  of food in country/. , A,4,  is  less than or equal to the  marginal
costofsupplyA,'.
(15)       aJOAj=  ^^j]   6if:JA±J±±-i;+  <-0
6L4/
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The marginal value product of the agricultural intemediate good in country/. is less
than or equal to the marginal cost of supplying the agricultural input to country/..
(16)      6if ex,j---v[j+A:  -hf  <_0
The  marginal  value  of the  agricultural  input  at /.,  A/2,   is  less  than  or  equal  to  the
marginal   cost  of  producing  the   input   in  country  J  plus   the   cost   of  transportation   of
agricultural inputs from / to/..
(17)      6if ex ,--- hf  +hf<_0
The marginal value of the agricultural input produced in / is less than or equal to the
marginal cost of producing fY/.
(i8)      6 roLj=  -wji.+ hj] 6if:JAdiD <-0
C)I,
If  variable  inputs  are  used  in  food  production  in  country  j,  the  marginal  value
product of the input will be equal to the exogenous prices of those purchased inputs.
(ig)      aroM]=  -wiM +  A;   I i;Jn_±4) <-0
6Ml
If variable inputs are used in agricultural production in country /,  the marginal value
product of the variable input will equal its exogenously determined price.
t2t])      aroD] --A,56ap::I.p]_M)-^i  <_o
GD/
The marginal  value product of the fixed resource used in agricultural production  in
country  /  will  be  less than or equal  to the marginal  cost of an additional  unit of the  fixed
resource,  or A/7.
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The objective of this research is to evaluate the impact trade costs, trade agreements
and  other  economic  and  demographic  characteristics  on  exports  of food  and  agricultural
products.  Establishing these effects requires estimation of the underlying parameters in the
conceptual   model   outlined   in   the   preceding   section.   Factors   characterizing   consumer
demand  for  food,  production  functions  for  food  manufacturing  and  agricultural  sectors,
resource   endowments   and   input   prices,   and   other  transportation   and   trade   costs   are
essential  in this estimation.
Food Trade
Marginal  revenue  in  the  food  manufacturing  sector  will  be  a  function  of demand
function parameters. The marginal cost of supplying food to destination market z. will equal
the  marginal  cost  of producing  food  in  countries  supplying  food  to  i.,  in  addition  to  all
transportation and/or trade costs associated with moving food from origin/. to destination z..
The  cost of procurement  in/. will  be  less  than  or  equal  to  the  marginal  cost  of producing
food.  The food production costs  in/. will be a function of production technology and input
costs of intermediate agricultural inputs and other non-traded purchased inputs. The cost of
the  intermediate  agricultural  input J4, will  depend  on  the  supply of this  input  in  country/.,
which can either be produced locally or imported from country /.
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riculture Trade
Agricultural  trade  occurs  if the  difference  between  the  value  of the  agricultural
input  in the  destination and origin countries,  (A,,2-  A/6J,  is equal to the cost of transporting
the  input  from  / to /..  The  marginal  value  product of the  agricultural  intermediate  input  in
country /.  is  equal  to  the  marginal  value  of  the  agricultural  input,  4.  The  agricultural
production function// A  /D/,  M),  the exogenous price of the variables inputs W/„  ,  and the
shadow price  of fixed  resources  used  in agricultural  production will jointly  determine the
marginal cost of producing the agricultural intermediate input in country /.
Transi)ortation and Trading Cost
In   the   case   of  both   food   and   agricultural   products,   no   trade   will   occur   if
transportation  and  trading  cost  exceeds  the  difference  between  procurement  cost  in  the
origin country and marginal revenue in the destination country.
Equations for Agricultural and Food Trade
Trade in raw agricultural commodities X/v and in food products for final demand 0,.,.
will be estimated.   Food trade will be determined  by trade costs and by marginal revenues
being  equal  to  marginal  costs  for each  producing  and  supply  country.  Marginal  revenues
depend  on  factors  affecting  consumer  demand  including  population,  income,  food  prices
and  other  prices  in  the  destination  market.  The  marginal  cost  of  food  production  will
depend on the  cost of the  agricultural  input and other variable  inputs and  food production
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technology  in  country /..  The  marginal  cost  of the  agricultural  input  depends  on  domestic
production  and trade Jr/y.  Agricultural  production will  depend  on  resource  endowments  in
producing countries, variable input costs and agricultural production technology in country
/.
Agricultural Trade
Combining the structural model presented above results in the following
conceptualization of the estimating equations for the model:
(21)       Xij = g(agricultural production technology in country I,  agricultural input costs in l,
[ranspor[a[ion and trade costs, resource endowments)
Agricultural trade will be estimated using three distinct models. The models include
variables  representing  income,  market  size,  factor  endowment,  historical  relationship  and
transportation cost.   Model  1  incorporates membership in trade agreements or associations
by  accounting  for  individual   participation  of  origin  and  destination  countries   in  each
Multilateral  Trade  Agreement  (MTA)  included  in the  sample.   Model  2  makes use  of the
same  MTAs  but  instead  accounts  for joint  participation  by  both  origin  and  destination
countries  in an association.  Model  3  combines the  MTA variables  of Models  1  and 2  (i.e.
variables representing individual participation of origin and destination countries as well as
a variable  for joint  participation).  Model  3  allows  statistical  measurement  of trade  within
the  MTAs  as  well  as  indicators  of trade  diversion  or  creation  associated  with  each  MTA
(Clarette et al. 2002).
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Model  1
The   equation   for  estimating   exports   of  agricultural   products   from   origin   /  to
destination/.  under model  1  takes the following form:
(21.1)       Xij  --PO  +  Pl  conlig  +  P2comlang_off +P3  Col45  +P4  D+  P5  GDP|  +P6  Popi +
P7GDPRalioi  +  P8  Factori  +  P9  GDpj  +  Plo  Popj  +  PI IGDPRatio[  +P12Factorj   +  P13
WToi +  P14  NAFTAi +Pl 5  EUi +P16 MERCOSURi +  f}17  CARICOMi +  P18 CACMi +P19
ANDEANi  +   P20  ASEANi+     P21   SPARTECAi  +P22   PATCRAi  +   P23   COMESAi  +   P24
SAFTAi +  P25  GAFTAi+  I)26  WToj  +   F}27  NAFTAj  +  P28  Euj  +  FJ29MERCOSURj  +  P30
CARICOMj   +   P3l   CACMj   +   P32ANDEANj  +     P33   ASEANj   +   P34   SPARTECAj   +fo35
PATCRAj +  P36 COMESAj +  fJ37  SAFTAj +  P38 GAFTAj +   s|j .
Model 2
The   equation   for  estimating   exports   of  agricultural   products   from   origin   /  to
destination/. under model 2 takes the following form:
(212)       Xij --PO  +  Pl  contig  +  P2comlang_off +P3  Col45  +P4  D+  P5  GDpi +P6  Pop| +
P7GDPRalioi  +  P8  Factori  +  P9  GDpj  +  Plo  Popj  +  F}11GDPRatioi  +FJ12Faclorj   +  P13
WTO_O*D    +    P14    NAFTA_O*D    +P15    EU_O*D    +P16    MERCOSUR_O*D    +    i)17
CARICOM_O*D  +  P18  CACM_O*D  +PI9  ANDEAN_O*D  +  P20  ASEAN_O*D  +    |321
SPARTECA_O*D  +P22  PATCRA_O*D  +  P23  COMESA_O*D  +  P24  SAFTA_O*D  +  P25
GAFTA_O*D  +   F:.ij
Variables  are  defined as  above  in  Model  1,  with the exception  of those  introduced
in this equation that measure joint membership  in the  specified MTAs.  The description of
variables are listed in Table  1.
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Table I. Description of Model Variables
Variable Description
JY,v amount of agriculture trade (exports) between country / and country/..
0„ amoiint of food trade between country/. and i.
Conlig Indicates  whether  the  two  countries  are  contiguous.   If  they  are  then  one,
otherwise the variables takes on a zero value
Comlang_off Common  language  (  when the  countries  share  an  official  common  language,
then one, otherwise the variable takes the value zero)
Col45 If the  countries  have  had  a  colonial  relationship  after  ]945,  then  one,  zero
otherwise.
D,J The weighted averagej  distance from country  I to country j  in  k"ometers.
GDPcapita GDP at   Purchasing Power Parity per capita
Pap The population of the country
GDPRalio Agriculture GDP as a percentage oftotal GDP.
Factor The ratio of arable  land (in thousand of` hectares) to agriculture  labor force (in
thousands).
WTO If country  is  a  member  of the  World  Trade  Organization,  then  the  variable
equals one, otherwise  it equals zero.
NAFTA If country  is  a  member  of the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement,  then
the variable equals one, otherwise  it equals zero.
EU If country  is  a  member  of the  European  Union,  then  the  variable  equals  one,
otherwise  it equals zero.
MERCOSUR lf country  is  a  member  of Mercado  Comun  del  Cono  Sur,  then  the  variable
equals one, otherwise  it equals zero.
CARICOM lfcountry  is a member of the Caribbean  Community,  then the  variable  equals
one, otherwise  it equals zero.
CACM If country  is  a  member of the  Central  American  Common  Market  ,  then  the
variable equals one,  otherwise  it equals zero.
ADEAN If country  is  a  member  of the  Andean  Community,  then  the  variable  equals
one, otherwise  it equals zero.
ASEAN If country  is  a  member  of the  Association  of Southeast  Asian  Nations,  then
the variable equals one, otherwise  it equals zero.
3    The  weighted  distance  measure  uses  city-level  data  to  assess  geographic  distribution  of the  population
inside  each  country.  The  distance  between  two  countries  is  calculated  based  on  bilateral  distances  between
the  largest  cities  of those  two  countries,  those  inter-city  distances  being  weighted  by  the  share  of the  city  in
the  country's overall  population  (CEPII).
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Table I. (continued)
Variable Description
SPARTECA If  country   is   a   member   of  the   South   Pacific   Regional   Trade   and
Economic   Cooperation   Agreement   ,   then   the   variable   equals   one,
otherwise  it equals zero.
PATCRA lf country  is  a  member of the  Papua  New  Guinea-Australia  Trade  and
Commercial    Relations    Agreement,    then    the    variable    equals    one,
otherwise it equals zero.
COMESA lfcountry is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa , then the variable equals one, otherwise  it equals zero.
SAFTA If country  is  a  member  of the  South  Asian  Free  Trade  Area,  then  the
variable equals one, otherwise  it equals zero.
GAFTA If country is a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement, then
the variable equals one, otherwise  it equals zero.
WTO  O*D //both origin and destination countries are members of WTO, then one,
otherwise zero.
NAFTA   O*D //both  origin  and  destination  countries  are  members  of NAFTA,  then
one, otherwise zero.
EU   O*D //both  origin  and  destination  countries  are  members  of EU,  then  one,
otherwise zero.
MERCOSUR   O*D //both  origin  and  destination  countries  are  members  of MERCOSUR,
then  one,  otherwise zero.
CARICOM  O*D // both  origin  and  destination  countries  are  members  of  CARICOM,
then one, otherwise zero.
CACM   O*D // both  origin  and  destination  countries  are  members  of CACM,  then
one, otherwise zero.
ANDEAN   O*D //both  origin  and destination  countries  are  members  of  the  ANDEAN
Community, then one,  otherwise zero
ASEAN   O*D //both  origin  and  destination  countries  are  members  of   ASEAN,  then
one, otherwise zero.
SPARTECA   O*D ..  //both  origin  and destination  countries  are  members  of SPARTECA,
then one, otherwise zero.
PATCRA   O*D //both origin and destination countries  are  members of PATCRA,  then
one.  otherwise zero.
COMESA   O*D //both origin and destination countries are members of COMESA, then
one,  otherwise zero.
SAFTA   ()*D //`both  origin  and  destination  countries  are  members  of SAFTA,  then
one,  otherwise zero.
GAFTA   O*D //both  origin  and  destination  countries  are  members  of GAFTA.  then
one, otherwise zero.
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Model 3
In order to capture the decomposition of total trade among MTA members, a third
model was added for both agricultural trade and food trade.  This model  combined Models
1  and 2 by including all MTA variables in the estimation. The overall effects of the various
trade agreements are, therefore, best explained by Model 3. The equation for Model 3 takes
the following form:
(21.3)        Xij =  PO  +  Pl  contig  +  P2comlang_of f +P3  Col45  +F}4  D+  Pi5  GDpi+P>6  Pop[+
P7GDPRatio;  +  P8  Factor;  +  P9  GOP,  +  Plo  Pap,  +  P11GDPJtc}fj.ot  +I)12Factor,    +  4/i
WToi +  i)14  NAFTAi +P15  Eui +P16  MERCOSUR[ +  P17  CARICOMi+  P18 CACMi +P19
ANDEANi  +   P20  ASEANi+     P21   SPARTECAi  +P22   PATCRAi  +   P23   COMESAi  +   fo24
SAFTAi +  P25  GAFTA| +  P26 WTO] +   P27  NAFTAj +  P28  Euj  +  P29MERCOSURj  +  P30
CARICOMj   +   P3I   CACMj   +   P32ANDEANj   +     P33   ASEANj   +   P34   SPARTECAj   +P35
PATCRAj  +   P36  COMESAj  +   P37  SAFTAj  +   P38  GAFTAj     +     P39  WTO_O*D  +   P40
NAFTA_O*D   +P41   EU_O*D  +P42   MERCOSUR_O*D   +   P43   CARICOM_O*D  +   P44
CACM_O*D  +P45  ANDEAN_O*D  +  P46  ASEAN_O*D  +    fJ47  SPARTECA_O*D  +P48
PATCRA_O*D +  P49 COMESA_O*D +  P50 SAFTA_O*D +  P5l  GAFTA_O*D +   E,ij
The variables in Model 3  are defined as above in Models  1  and 2. Model  3  includes
dummy  variables  on  joint  membership,  O*D  ASSNk;    dummy  variables  indicating  the
origin's  membership  in the  agreement,  O_ASSNk;  and  dummy  variables  representing  the
destination's  membership   in  the  agreement,   D_ASSNk.   This  approach  mimics  that  of
Soloaga and Winters (2001) and Clarete, Edmonds and Wallack (2002). The coefflcient on
O_Assnk represents the origin country's exports to non-members of the bloc, or the general
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liberalization   effect   on   exports.   Likewise,   the   coefficient   on   D  Assnk   represents   the
additional    imports   to   the   destination    country    from   non-members,    or   the    general
liberalization  effect  on  imports  (Clarete,  Edmonds  and  Wallack  2002).   O*D  Assnk  is  an
interaction  term  on  origin  and  destination  membership  (i.e.,  joint  membership)  in  the
agreement.  The  coefficient  on this  variable  represents  intra-bloc trading  or the  additional
exports  from  origin to  destination when both countries  are  members  of the  association.  A
combination  of the  coefficients  on  the  three  MTA  related  variables  represents  the  total
effect of the arrangement on member trade.
Combining  the  three  dummy  variables  in  one  model  allows  us  to  evaluate  the
contribution  of the  agreement  to  intra-bloc  trade  and  to  trade  with  the  rest  of the  world
(ROW).   In  instances  of  trade   diversion,   the   coefficient  on  joint  membership   will   be
positive   while   the   sum   of   the   coefficients   on   origin   membership   and   destination
membership  will  be  negative  indicating  that  the  arrangement  reduces  imports  from  the
global  market  more  than  it  increases  exports  to  the  global  market.  In  cases  where  the
arrangement   enhances   intra-bloc   trade   as   well   as   trade   with   non-members,   both   the
coefficient on joint membership and the  sum of the coefficients on origin membership and
destination membership will be positive (Clarete, Edmonds and Wallack 2002).
The  equations  for  agricultural  trade  contain  variables  that  will  represent  demand
and supply of agricultural products.  Overall  consumer demand will be  influenced by GDP
per capita and the total  population within the  country.  Supply  of agriculture  products  will
be  influenced  by  factors  of production  including  agricultural  labor  and  arable  land.  The
level  of trading  will  be  affected  by  combinations  of factors  including  the  transportation
costs, trading relationships and other commonalities between countries.
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GDP  per  capita  and  the  GDP  ratio  (which  includes  agricultural  GDP)  will  act  as
proxies   for   agricultural   production   technology   since   technological   advances   in   the
agricultural  sector will  depend on the  level  of income  and  investment  in  the  economy.  In
many countries, particularly developing countries, the agricultural sector is labor intensive.
Agricultural  input  costs  therefore  predominantly  reflect  agricultural  labor  cost.  Resource
endowment   is   represented   by   arable   land   since   land   is   the   main   resource   used   in
agricultural production. The ratio of the two provides a productivity estimate for the sector.
Distance data acts as a proxy for transportation cost while trade costs are represented by the
other factors in the  system that affect communication and the level of tariff and non-tariff
barriers.   These   include  language  and  colonial  relationships  as  well   as  membership  in
trading agreements.
Food Trade
Estimation  for  food  trade  also  included  three  models.  Similar  to  the  agricultural
trade  models,  model   1   accounts  for  individual   participation  of  origin   and  destination
countries in each Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTA) included in the estimation.   Model
2  accounts  for joint participation of both   origin and destination country  in an agreement.
Model 3 combines all MTA variables from Models  1  and 2.
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Model  1
(22)  Qj, --  gifood demand, food production technology, i ood input cost, transportation and
trade costs, participation in MTAs)
Specifically, the equation to estimate food trade using Model  1  is as follows:
(22.I)       Qj,=  flo  +  Pl contig +  P2comlang_Off.+P3  Col45  +P4  D+  PS GDpi+Pi6 Popi +
P7GDPRatio;  +  P8  Factor/  +  P9  GDP,  +  Plo  Pap,  +  P11GDPJic7/;.o/  +P12Factor,    + 4J3
WToi +  fol4 NAFTAi +Pl 5  Eui +P16  MERCOSURi+  P17  CARICOMi +  P18 CACMi +P19
ANDEANi  +   P20  ASEANi+     P2l   SPARTECAi  +P22   PATCRAi  +   P23   COMESAi  +   P24
SAFTA| +  P25  GAFTA[+  P26 WToj  +   P27  NAFTAj  +  P28  Euj +  P29MERCOSURj  +  P30
CARICOMj  +   P31   CACMj  +   P32ANDEiINj  +      F)33   ASEANj   +   P34  SPARTECAj   +|}35
PATCRAj +  P36 COMESAj +  P37  SAFTAj +  P38 GAFTAj  +   i:ij
Variables are defined as above in the agricultural trade equation, with the exception
of those introduced in this equation:
Q/.,.:  amount  of food  exports  from  origin/.  to  destination  i.  using  the  BEC  classification.
Food  exports  are  defined  as  food and beverage trade  for household  consumption (i.e., the
food  product)  and  combines  BEC  Classification  112  (Food  and  Beverage  (Primary)  for
Household Consumption) and BBC  Classification  122 (Food and Beverage (Processed) for
Household Consumption).
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Model  2
(22 2  )      Qji =  P() +  Pl con[ig +  P2comlang_off +P3  Col45  +P4 D+ Pis GDpi +B6 Popi +
ft7GDPRatio|  +  FT8  Factori + Pi9  GDpj  +  F}10  Popj  +  PllGDPRatioi  +B12  Factorj   +  f}13
WT()_O*D    +    P14    NAFTA_O*D    +P15    EU_O*D    +P]6    MERCOSUR_O*D    +    P17
CARICOM_O*D  +  f}18  CACM_O*D  +P19  ANDEAN_O*D  +  P20  ASEAN_O*D  +    P2l
SPARTECA_O*D  +P22  PATCRA_O*D  +  P23  COMESA_O*D +  P24  SAFTA_O*D  +  f}25
GAFTA_O*D +   ei,
Model 3
Model  3  under food trade is  identical to that introduced under agricultural trade.  It
combines  the  MTA  variables  from  models  1  and  2.  The  equation  for  model  3  takes  the
following form:
(22.3)         Qij =  flo  +  Pl  contig +  P2comlang_of f +P3  Col45  +P14  D+  P5  GDpi+Pi6  Pop| +
P7GDPRatioi  +  i)8  Factori +  pe  GDpj  +  Plo  Popj  +  Pl\GDPRatioi  +PiL2.Factorj   +  P13
WTO| +  P14 NAFTAi +P15  Eui +P16 MERCOSURi +  P17  CARICOMi +  Pl8 CACMi +P19
ANDEANi  +   [320  ASEAN[+     f}2l   SPARTECAi  +P22   PATCRAi  +   P23   COMESAi  +   P24
SAFTAi+  P25  GAFTAi  +  P26  WToj  +   P27  NAFTAj  +  P28  Euj  +  P29MERCOSURj +  P30
CARICOMj   +   P3l   CACMj   +   P32ANDEANj   +     P33   ASEANj   +   P34   SPARTECAj   +P35
PATCRAj  +   P36  COMESAj  +   P37   SAFTAj  +   P38  GAFTAj     +     P39  WTO_O*D  +   P40
NAFTA_O*D   +P41   EU_O*D  +P42   MERCOSUR_O*D  +   P43   CARICOM_O*D   +   P44
CACM_O*D  +P45  ANDEAN_O*D  +  P46  ASEAN_O*D  +    FJ47  SPARTECA_O*D  +f}48
PATCRA_O*D +  P49 COMESA_O*D +  P50 SAFTA_O*D +  P5l  GAFTA_O*D +   €|j
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The  equation  for  food  trade  comprises  variables  that  represent  food  demand  and
supply.    The  demand  for  food  is  determined  by  individual  consumers  maximizing  utility
subject to  a budget  constraint.  Underlying factors  influencing consumer choices  (i.e.  food
demand)  include  income,  food  prices  and  other prices  faced  by the  consumer.  Total  food
demand will be influenced by the population of country i. Variables such as GDP per capita
and population will therefore be used to model food demand in the equations.
Food  production technology  will  be  represented  by  income  (i.e„  GDP  per capita).
Since  food  production  combines  purchased  inputs  and  intermediate  agricultural  inputs,
those  costs  associated  with  agricultural  inputs will  also  affect  food  input  cost.  Therefore,
estimated agricultural  exports  in primary  form  may  also  affect  food  input  costs.  As  with
agriculture,  distance  data for food trade  act  as proxies  for transportation  cost.  Trade  costs
are   represented   by   variables   such   as   language   and   colonial   relationships   as   well   as
membership  in trading agreements.  These  contribute to  information costs,  communication
costs and the cost of policy barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers).
Data
The  estimating  equations  resemble  the  basic  gravity  model  and  include  variables
representing economic  size, historical and cultural relationships,  geographic characteristics
and  trading  relations.  All  factors  impact  agriculture  and  food  trade,  either on the  demand
side or the supply  side.  However, unlike the gravity model, exports from/. to /. and exports
from  z.  to /.  are  viewed  as  separate  observations.  Other  changes  include  consideration  of
procurement   of supplies  from  country  /  used  in  food  production.  There  are  variables  for
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both   agriculture   trade   and   food   trade.   Common   variables   include   population,   gross
domestic product per capita, distance,  foreign direct investment and trade agreements.  The
equation  for agriculture trade  also  included Agriculture GDP per capita,  agricultural  labor
and arable land.
EXport  data  were  collected  from  the   United  Nations  Commodity  Trade  Statistics  Database  and
include classification  by Broad  Econoniic Categories (BBC) def`ned  in terms of the Standard  lnternational  trade
Classiflcation  (SITC).  Revision  3   Exports  under  BEC  are  classified  as  BEC   111   (Food  and
Beverage (Primary) for Industry), BEC  121  (Food and Beverage (Processed) for Industry),
BBC  112 (Food and Beverage (Primary) for Household Consumption) and BEC  122 (Food
and Beverage (Processed) for Household Consumption).  Population flgures were  collected
from  the  Penn  World  Tables.  Gross  Domestic  Product  based  on purchasing-power parity
per capita in US dollars is from the World Economic Outlook Database (April 2005) of the
lnternational  Monetary  Fund  and  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  World  Fact-Book  for
2004. Data on agricultural GDP per capita, agriculture labor force and arable land are from
the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  of the  United Nations  (FAO  Statistical  Yearbook
2005-2006).  Data  for countries  not reported  here  in the  FAO  dataset were  collected  from
the CIA World Fact-Book.  Membership in major trading agreements was determined from
the World Trade Organization's list of trade agreements in force.  Distance data along with
those variables marking commonality in colonial relationships and language were collected
from  the  Centre  d'Etudes  Prospectives  et  d'Informations  Intemationales  (CEPII)  bilateral
trade files.
Within every  data set there  were a few missing  observations.  Data for the missing
observations   were   collected   from   other   sources   to   ensure   that   most   countries   had
42

CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This  chapter  presents  ordinary  least  squares  estimates  of  the  coefficients  of  the
models for agricultural intermediate goods trade and food trade for a 2004 cross section of
183   countries.      Models   were   estimated   using   the   PROC   Model   procedures   in   SAS.
Observations  were  available  for  7,492  agricultural  intermediate  good  trade  flows  and  for
10,957  food  trade  flows.    Continuous  variables  were  converted  to  logarithms  to  enable
interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities.
All     models     estimated     indicated     the     presence     of    heteroskedasticity.     The
Heteroskedasticity   Consistent   Covariance   Matrix   Estimator   was   thus   used  to   provide
consistent estimates of the coefficient standard errors.  In addition to heteroskedasticity, the
correlation   matrix   of  independent   variables   showed  high   correlations   among   various
independent   variables.   Collinearity   testing   in   SAS   confirmed   the   presence   of  multi-
collinearity  in  the  models.  The  effect  of each  individual  variable  was  then  evaluated  by
expanding the  model  one variable  at  a time.  With  each variable  added,  the model  was re-
evaluated  and  examined  for  major  changes  in  individual  coefficients  which  would  imply
that multi-collinearity existed.  Particular attention  was  paid to  changes  in the  signs  of the
estimated coefficients.
The  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  variable  was  highly  correlated  with  Gross
Domestic  Product  (GDP)  per  capita  and  was  consequently  removed  from  the  estimation.
Other  high  correlations   existed  between  income  variables,  population  and  agricultural
resource  variables.    The  ratio  of arable  land  and  agricultural  labor  were  used  to  create  a
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new variable,  factor,  to  reduce  potential  collinearity  issues.    Arable  land  and  agricultural
labor are used as proxies for technology level in agricultural producing countries.
Trade Flows of Agricultural Intermediate Goods
Table  2  presents  ordinary  least  square  (OLS)  estimates  of the  coefficients  of the
agricultural intermediate goods trade model with cross sectional data for the year 2004. The
columns  show independent variables,  regression  coefficients,  and t-statistics derived  from
heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard errors.  The  empirical  models perform  adequately  in
explaining  bilateral  trade  flows  of agricultural  intermediate  good  among  countries.  The
adjusted R2 for the three models are .35, .29   and .36, respectively.
Model S ecification Tests
Likelihood ratio tests  (LRTs) were used to  compare models  1  and 2  against model
3.  Both  models  I  and models  2  are nested  in model  3.  Hence,  model  3  is  the  unrestricted
model and models  I  and 2 are restricted. Asymptotically, the LR test statistic is distributed
as   a   chi-squared   random   variable,   with   degrees   of  freedom   equal   to   the   exclusion
restriction i.e. the number of parameters excluded from the restricted model.
LR = 2(Lur - LT)
The   first  test   included   models   1   and   3.     We  test  the   null   hypothesis  that  the
restrictions  are  equal  to  zero  or  that  there  is  no  difference  in  the  two  models.  The  log-
likelihood  values  were  extracted  from  the  proc  model  regressions  performed  in  SAS  and
used to calculate the likelihood ratio statistics.
45
Table 2. Estimated Coefricients of the Models for Agricultural Intermediate Goods
(t-statistics in bold)
Model  I Model 2 Model 3
Constant -I    1589 * 4 23052 -0 8387
- I .76 -6.72 -I.17
Con[,g I  2582 " I   5755 I  .3218
9.27 11.55 9.61
comlang_ofT` 0 6353 0  5348 " 0  5410
7.37 6.06 6.13
col45 I  5224 *** I  4859 1   6004
8.19 7.82 8.4
Distwces -0 9959 " -0  5749 -0  8942
-24.72 -14.07 -19.44
O_GDPcapita 0 3262 0`4 817 0.3 I 23
6.92 12.97 6.62
O_Pop 0 6940 0'6432 " 0 6927 *,,
31.44 29.84 31.33
0   GDPRatio 0  8633 0.3106 0 9238
6.75 2.69 7.16
0   Factor 0  0 I 29 0,0128 0  0131
4.49 8.29 4.58
D_GDPcapita 0  5359 0'5281 0  5371
14.28 15.72 I 4.38
D_Pop 0  6255 - 0,5914 *** 0 6229
31.17 32.10 31.06
D   GDPRatio 01318 0 2890 01369
1.49 3.45 1.55
D   Factor -0 0048 -0.0046 .0  0045
-I.73 -2.55 - I .6 I
()  WTO 0  3010 ** -0  7726
2.IS -2,71
0  N^FTA I  0960 I  0507
4.81 4.54
0EU 0.7613 * 0.7037
8.05 6.86
0   MERCOSUR 2  7295 2 6300
I 6. I 6 I 5. I 4
0   CARICOM 0  8325 0.0747
3.08 0.23
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Table 2. (continued)
Model  I Model 2 Model 3
0  CACM 2 3246 2 2446 •-
13.84 12.6
0   ANDEAN 116191 •„ I   5834
9.23 8.8
()   ASE^N I  8453 1   8037
1 4. I 7 13.I
0   SPARTECA 3 2470 31038 I
16.20 14.58
0  PATCRA -2  4793 -2  4704
-6.01 -S.99
0  COMESA 0  8556 0.8127
5.51 4.96
0  SAI,TA -0 3603 -0 4057 *
-I.73 -I.91
0  GAFTA -0  5968 -0 6966
-3.77 -3.96
DWTO 0 0889 -I    1233 *
0.97 -3.7
D   NAFTA 0'3436 0 2998
I.42 I.23
DEU 01718 01004
I.75 0.9
D   MERCOSUR -0  7653 " -0  9235
-4.42 -S.16
D  CARICOM 0  3361 ** -0  0848
2.04 -0.51
D  CACM -0  5424 •- -0  6006
-2.85 -I.XO
D  ANDEAN -0 9089 ®®, -0 9426
-4.40 4.38
D  ASEAN 0,4355 " 014037
2.96 2.57
D   SPARTECA 0 4795 0 2939
2.18 I.22
D   PATCRA -0   I  152 -0  0562
-0.29 -0.14
D  COMESA -0 0464 -0  0920
-0.33 -0.61
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Table 2. (continued)
Model  I Model 2 Model 3
D   SAFTA -0 3086 -0`3482
- I .5 I -I.67
D   GAF`TA 0 4990 0 4351
436 3.63
WTO O*D Oj I 63 I  3233
3.84 4.24
NAFTA O*D I  9502 " I  0837 *
4.94 2.55
EU  O*D 0  7 I 24 ." 0 3292
5.87 2.26
MbRCOSUR O*D 2.3252 I  0509 *
4.11 I.71
CARIC`OM O*D 2.3750 " 2  7657
6.44 5.65
CACM O*D 2,2936 " 0  7 I 03
10J6 2.08
ANDEAN  O*D 0  1 893 0 0296
0.28 0.04
ASEAN  O*D I  7080 " -0 2205
4.88 -0.53
SPARTECA O*D 2  8715 " 0 7864 *
7.99 I.90
PATCRA O*D -2  0260 -0.4191
-5.04 -0.77
C`OMESA O*D 0  8823 0 4377
2.52 I.08
sArTA O*D -0  7541 0 2435
-0.74 0.23
GAFTA O*D 04047 0.6206 *
I.49 I.91
Number of Obs. 7492 7492 7492
Adjusted  R2 OJ535 0.2946 OJ593
***,  **  and  *  denote  significance at the  1, 5  and  10 percent levels.
In the  LR  Test  of models  1  and  3  for agricultural  trade,  the  LR  statistic  is -1010.
Since  this  calculated  value  in  absolute  term  is  greater  than  the  chi-square  value  at   13
degrees  of freedom,  we  reject  the  null  hypothesis  in  favor  of the  alternative.  Model  3  is
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superior  to  model   1.  An  identical  test  was  conducted  to  compare  models  2  and  3   of
agricultural  trade.  The  computed  LR  statistic  is  -9746.  The  calculated  value  exceeds  the
chi-square  value  at  26   degrees  of  freedom   so  we   reject  the   null   hypothesis  that  the
restrictions are equal to zero, proving that Model 3 is also superior to model 2.
Determinants of Trade Flows
The  estimated  coefficient  on  contiguity  is   statistically  significant  and  positive.
Adjoining  countries  do  trade  more  than  those  separated  by  land  or  sea.  All  models  are
consistent indicating that contiguity increases agricultural good trade by  1.32  percerlt.  The
coefficient  on  comlang_off indicates  that  countries  sharing  a  common  official  language
will trade more than those not sharing a common official language.  Historical relationships
between countries  also  positively impact trade.  The  col45  variable has  a positive  sign and
is  statistically  significant,  indicating that there will be more trade between those countries
that  were  in  a  colonial  relationship  after  1945  regardless  of current  official  relationships.
Similar to  other trade  studies,  the  distance  variable  is  negatively  related  to trade  between
countries.      Since   distance   serves   as   a  proxy   for  transportation/transaction   costs,   this
indicates  that  increased transportation costs  act as  a trade  deterrent.  The  farther apart two
countries are. the more costly it is to trade. Increased trading cost will erode potential gains
from trade. For model 3, each additional (log of) kilometer distance reduces trade values by
.89 percent.
The  estimated  coefficients  of GDP  per  capita  for  both  origin  and  destination  are
statistically significant and have positive signs. Per capita GDP is a measure of a country's
personal  wealth  or  income.  Countries  with  higher  income  will  produce  and  export  more
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intermediate agricultural goods. The income of the destination country or importer signifies
purchasing power.  Destination countries with higher income are seen to import more.   The
estimated  coefficients  on  population  for  both  origin  and  destination  countries  are  also
statistically  significant  and positive.  Since  population  represents  market  size,  the  increase
in market  size will  increase both exports and imports.  A  large population in the exporting
country may indicate greater availability of labor resources which will improve production
capacity.  A  large population  in the  importing country  signifies  a large consumer base that
will demand more imports.
While  the  ratio  of agricultural  GDP  to  total  GDP  is  positive  for  both  origin  and
destination  countries,   it  is   only   statistically   significant  for  the   exporting   country.   As
agricultural  GDP  as  a  percentage  of GDP  increases  by  one  percent,  agricultural  exports
increase  0.92  percent  for  origin  countries  and  0.14  percent  for destination  countries.  The
estimated  coefficient  on  the  ratio  of arable  land  to  agricultural  labor  (or  Factor)  for  the
exporting  country  is  statistically  significant  and  has  a positive  sign.  Interpreting  a  higher
land   to   labor   ratio   as   an   indicator   of  increasing   productivity,   increased   agricultural
productivity  in  the  exporting  country  translates  to  more  efficient  production  and  more
exports.  For  importing  countries,  the  Factor  variable  is  statistically  significant  at  the   10
percent level  and carries a negative signs indicating that as the agricultural productivity of
the importing country increases, they will import fewer intermediate agricultural goods.
Effects of Individual Trading Blocs
The   estimated   coefficient   for   the   WTO   variable   for   exporting   countries   is
statistically  significant  with  a  negative  sign  indicating  that  the  origin's  membership  in
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WTO decreases  export volume to non-members.  The coefficient on the  WTO variable  for
importing  countries  is  also  statistically  significant  and  negative  indicating  that  imports
from the rest of the world is also reduced.
The   dummy   variable   representing   joint   membership    in   WTO   is   statically
signiflcant  and  positive   indicating  that  WTO   membership  has   enhanced  trade   among
member  countries.  The  overall  effect  of the  World  Trade  organization  is  trade  enhancing
for  members.  These  results  reflect  the  wide  embrace  of WTO  membership.  One  hundred
fifty one of the countries in the sample were members of WTO in 2004.
The  estimated  coefficient  for  NAFTA  membership  is  statistically  significant  and
positive  for  the  exporting  country  but  is  not  statistically  significant  for  the  importing
country.   The   estimated   coefficient   on  joint  NAFTA   membership   is   also   statistically
significant  and  positive  indicating  that  NAFTA  has  enhanced  trade  among  its  members.
Since the  coefficient on  importers was not  statistically  significant,  it appears that NAFTA
has  positively  influenced  exports,  yet  has  not  affected  imports  into  the  three  NAFTA
countries from non-member nations.
Similar to the effects of NAFTA, the coefficient for EU membership is statistically
significant   and   positive   for  exporting   countries   but   is   not   statistically   significant   for
importers,   implying  that  the  EU  has  been  effective  in  improving  export  trade   for  its
member countries.  The EU dummy variable for joint membership is statistically signiflcant
and positive indicating enhanced trade among EU members, one of the primary objectives
underlying the formation of the EU.
The  estimated  coefficient  on  the  variable  MERCOSUR  is  statistically  signiflcant
and  has  a  positive  sign  for  exporters.  The  coefficient  on  MERCOSUR  membership  for
51
imports  from  non-members  is  statistically  significant  and  negative.  Although  this  MTA
encourages  trade  within  the  group,  it  does  so  at  the  expense  of trade  with  non-members,
effectively   limiting   member   countries'   access   to   imports   from   outside   sources.   The
coefficient on joint membership in MERCOSUR is statistically significant at the  10 percent
level  and  positive.  MERCOSUR has  benefitted  trade  among  members,  and  has  increased
exports    to    non-members.    While    there    have    been    significant    tariff   reduction    for
MERCOSUR members, the  introduction of the common external tariff actually  raised the
average tariff rate for some member countries. (Yeats 1998)
The  coefficients  on  the  CARICOM  variables  are  not  statistically  significant  for
exports   to   and   imports   from   non-member   countries.   The   dummy   variable   for  joint
membership   in   CARICOM  is   statistically   significant  and  positive.   This   indicates  that
CARICOM has improved trade activities among member countries but has not contributed
to enhanced trade with the rest of the world.
The  estimated  coefficients  on  the  CACM  variables  are  statistically  significant  for
exports and imports with non-member countries.  The positive sign on CACM membership
for  the   exporting   country   indicates   that  there   is   a   positive   relationship   between  the
exporting  country's CACM  membership  and trade to  non-members.  There  is a significant
and negative correlation between CACM membership and imports from non-members. The
estimated  coefficient  on  CACM joint membership  is  statistically  significant  and  positive.
The   significance   of  the   coefficient   on  joint   CACM   membership   is   associated   with
improvement in trade among members.
The estimated coefficient on ANDEAN membership is statistically  significant and
has a positive sign for exporters. On the contrary, the coefficient on ANDEAN membership
52
for   imports   from   non-members   is   statistically   significant   and   negative.    While   the
ANDEAN  pact  has  a  significant  positive  effect  on  exporters,  the  negative  effects  this
agreement  has  on  importers  seem  to  be  more  pronounced.    The  estimated  coefficient  on
joint  membership  in  the  ANDEAN  community  is  not  statistically  significant,  indicating
little to no effect on trade among members.
The  coefflcients  for  ASEAN  membership  are  statistically  significant  and  positive
for  both  exporting  and  importing  countries,  implying  that  ASEAN  has  been  effective  in
improving   import   and   export   trade   to   non-members.   The   dummy   variable   for  joint
membership  in  ASEAN  is  not  statistically  significant,  indicating  that  while  ASEAN  has
enhanced trade  with the  rest  of the  world,  it  has  not contributed to  improvement  of intra-
bloc trade.
Similarly,  membership  in  SPARTECA  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  for
origin countries  but  is  not  statistically  signiflcant  for destination  countries,  indicating that
this agreement has enhanced export trade to non-members without having much effect on
import  trade  from  non-members.  The  estimated  coefficient  on  the  dummy  variables  for
joint  membership  in  SPARTECA  is  statistically  significant  at  the   10  percent  level  and
positive.  SPARTECA has enhanced intra-bloc trade for its members.
The dummy variable representing PATCRA membership for exporting countries  is
statistically  significant  and  has  a  negative  sign  indicating  that  exporters'  membership  in
PATCRA  will  reduce  their  trade  volume  to  non-members.  The  coefficient  on  PATCRA
membership  for  importing  countries  also  carries  a  negative  sign  but  is  not  statistically
significant.   The   dummy   variable   on  joint   PATCRA   membership   is   not   statistically
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signiflcant  indicating  that  PATCRA  membership  has  not  improved  intra-bloc  trade  for
members.
The  estimated  coefficient  on  the  COMESA  variable  for  exporting  countries  is
statistically  signiflcant  and  has  a  positive  sign  indicating  a positive  impact  on  exports to
non-members.  The coefficient for importers'  membership in COMESA is negative but not
statistically  significant.    COMESA  membership  is  associated  with  trade  enhancement  to
their  exporters.  The  coefficient  on  the  COMESA  variable  for joint  membership  is  not
signiflcant  indicating  that  this  trade  agreement  has  not  contributed  to  enhanced  trade
amongst members.
The dummy variables on SAFTA membership indicates that this agreement has not
been  effective  in  enhancing  trade  among  its  members.  Both  coefficients  for  exports  and
imports carry negative  signs and are  significant at the  10 percent level.  The coefficient on
joint  membership  is  not  statistically  significant.  Even  controlling  for  income,  agricultural
production,  and other factors considered,  members  of SAFTA  are not major exporters  or
importers of agricultural goods.
The  estimated  coefficient  on  GAFTA  membership   for  exporters  is  statistically
significant  and  has  a  negative  sign  indicating  a  negative  correlation  between  exporters'
membership  in  GAFTA  and  trade  volume  to  non-members.  Imports  from  non-member
countries,   on   the   other   hand,   is   statistically   significant   and   positive   indicating   that
membership  in this agreement is associated with increased agricultural  imports.  Estimated
coefflcients  representing joint  membership  in  GAFTA is  statistically  significant at  the  10
percent level and positive indicating that GAFTA has also led to increased intra-bloc trade.
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Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
Under  Model  3,  emphasis  was  placed  on  analyzing  the  nature  of trade  resulting
from the  13  trade agreements included in the  sample. Hypothesis testing was conducted to
determine  if an  arrangement  led  to  trade  creation  or  trade  diversion.  The  test  involved
calculating  the   sum  of  the  coefficients  on  exports  from  and  imports  to  non-member
countries.  According to Clarete,  Edmonds and Wallack (2002),  trade-diverting behavior is
evident when coefficients on joint membership are positive and the sum of the coefficients
on origin and destination membership in the agreement are negative. A positive coefficient
on joint membership along with a positive sum of the coefficients on exporter and importer
membership will indicate that the agreement has expanded intra-bloc trade as well as trade
with the rest of the world.
We test the null  hypothesis that the coefficients on  0  ASSNK  + D_ASSNK  =0  for
the  trade  agreements  in  the  study.  Specifical[y,  the  null  hypothesis  assumes  no  effect  on
agricultural trade between members and non-members of trade associations.  Results of the
hypothesis tests for agricultural trade are reported in Table 3.
The  results  for  agricultural  trade  indicate  that  11  of the  13  trade  agreements  have
significant  effects  on  trade  between  members  and  non-members:  WTO,  NAFTA,  EU.
MERCOSUR,  CACM,  ANDEAN  Pact,  ASEAN,  SPARTECA, PATCRA,  COMESA and
SAFTA. The coefficients on CARICOM and GAFTA are not statistically signiflcant, so we
fail to reject the null of no effect.   Of the agreements included in the study, three are found
to  have  trade-diverting  effects  since  the  summation  of the  coefficients  on  imports  and
exports  with  non-members  is  negative:  WTO,  PATCRA  and  SAFTA.    This  means  that
these  three  agreements  have  diverted  agricultural  trade  from  the  rest  of  the  world  to
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member  countries.  The  majority  of the  MTAs  have  positively  and  significantly  affected
agricultural trade with countries outside of the specific MTAs.
Table 3. Hypothesis Tests of Trade Creation/Diversion Effects of Membership in an MTA for
Agricultural Trade
Equation Coefficient T-Stat Wald
0  WTO + D  WTO -I.8958 -3.37 I  I.36
0  NAFTA + D  NAFTA I.3505 3.94 I 5 .49
0   EU + D   EU 0.8041 4.78 22.81
0  MERCOSUR+ D   MERCOSUR I .7065 6.61 43 .71
0  CARICOM + D  CARICOM -0.0101 -0.03 0
0  CACM + D  CACM 1 .644 1 5.94 35.29
0  ANDEAN + D  ANDEAN 0.6408 2.27 5.17
0  ASEAN + D  ASEAN 2.2074 10.14 102.86
0  SPARTECA + D  SPARTECA 3.3977 10. I 4 102.82
0   PATCRA + D   PATCRA -2.5266 -4.31 18.55
0  COMESA + D  COMESA 0.7207 3.14 9.89
0   SAFTA + D   SAFTA -0.7538 -2.51 6.32
0  GAFTA + D  GAFTA -0 .26 1 5 -I .20 I.43
While  WTO  has  increased  intra-bloc  trading  aniongst members by  1.32  percent,  it
has  done  so  at  the  expense  of trade  with  non-members.  Both the  coefficient  on  0  Assnk
and D_Assnk are negative indicating that this agreement has reduced exports to and imports
from  outside  sources.  In  addition  the  coefficient  on  the  summation  of extra-bloc  trade  is
statistically significant at the  1  percent level and negative indicating that WTO has diverted
trade from non-members to member countries. WTO members are more likely to trade with
each  other  instead  of trading  with  other  non-WTO  countries.  The  overall  effects  of the
MTAs on agricultural trade are listed in Table 4.
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Table 4. Overall Effect of Individual MTA on Agricultural Trade
0  Assn D  Assn O*D Assn 0  ^ssn + D  Assn
WTO - *** - *** + *** - ***
NAFTA + *** + + *** + ***
EU + *** + + ** + **
MBRCOSUR + *** - *** + * + ***
CARICOM + - + *** -
CACM + *** *** + ** + ***
ANDEAN + *** - *** + + **
ASEAN + *** + ** - + *+*
SPARTECA + *** + + * + ***
PATCRA - *** - - - ***
COMESA + *** - + + ***
SAFTA - * - * + - ***
GAFTA - *** + *** + * -
***,  ** and  *  denote  significance at the  I,  5  and  10 percent levels.
+ denotes a positive sign on the coefficient and -denotes a negative sign  on the coefficient.
The  results  of  this  study  found  NAFTA  to  be  entirely  trade  creating.  NAFTA
exporters  have  expanded  exports  I.05  percent  as  a  result  of NAFTA  membership  while
imports  from  non-NAFTA  members  increased  by  .3  percent.   In  addition,  NAFTA  has
expanded  trade  amongst  its  members  by   1.08  percent.  The  coefficient  on  O_ASSNK  +
D_ASSNK  for  NAFTA  is  positive,  further  indicating  the  trade  creating  effects  of  this
arrangement.   There was signiflcant trade among NAFTA members prior to the agreement,
which may be one reason why trade diversion was not evident in this association.
The  EU  and   SPARTECA  have  similar  results  to  those  of  NAFTA.   Both  have
expanded trade for exporters and importers to and from non-member countries. The EU has
increased   exports   of  agricultural   goods   to   world   markets   by   0.7   percent.   EU   and
SPARTECA  have  also  expanded  intra-  bloc  trade  by  0.33  and  0.79  percent,  respectively.
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The coefficients on the calculated values representing extra-bloc trade indicate that EU and
SPARTECA are both trade creating.
MERCOSUR  has  expanded  trade  for  its  exporters  by  2.6  percent  but  market
openness  to  imports  has  been  restricted.  While  this  arrangement  has  increased  intra-bloc
trading amongst members and has not shown significant signs of trade diversion, importers
from the rest of the world have restricted access to the MERCOSUR market. The nature of
trade created by MERCOSUR to non-members is attributed to export expansion.
CARICOM   membership   is   characterized   by   increased   intra-bloc   trading   and
increased  exports  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  However,  there  is  clear  evidence  of  trade
diversion  within  this  grouping.  The  coefficient  on  destination  membership  indicates  that
CARICOM had no effect on imports from the rest of the world
CACM,  the  ANDEAN  Community  and  COMESA  are  characterized  by  export
expansion   and   increased   intra-bloc   trade   but   membership   in   these   markets   has   not
increased  imports  from  the  rest  of  the  world.   They  have  reduced  imports   from  non-
members  by  0.6,  0.94  and  0.09  percent  respectively.  The  coefficients  on  O_ASSNK  +
D_ASSNK  for the  three  arrangements  are  statistically  significant  and  positive,  indicating
trade creation.  The  effects of export expansion have  overshadowed any negative effect on
imports.
While  ASEAN has opened  its market to global  trade,  i.e.  trade  with the rest of the
world,  it has done so at the expense of intra-bloc trade.  While exports to and imports from
the  rest  of the  world have  increased by  1.8  and  0.4  percent,  respectively,  intra-bloc  trade
was  reduced  by  0.22  percent.  The  enhanced  trade  with  non-members  has  led  to  trade
creation for members and there is no evidence of trade diversion under this arrangement.
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The coefficients on all  MTA variables  in the  estimation for PATCRA membership
are negative or not statistically different from zero. This implies that PATCRA provides no
influence on agricultural trade for members.
Both  SAFTA  and  GAFTA  were  shown  to  reduce  exports  to  outside  countries.
While  SAFTA  has  reduced  imports  from  the  rest  of the  world,  GAFTA  has  opened  its
market to imports. SAFTA and GAFTA have both led to increased intra-bloc trade but both
also show signs of trade diversion.
Trade Flows of Food Products
The  results  of the  food trade  models  are  presented  in  Table  5.  The  columns  show
independent   variables,   regression   coefficients,   and   t-statistics   derived   from   White's
heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors.  The  adjusted  R2  for  models  1,  2  and  3  are
0.46. 0.43  and 0.47, respectively.
Model S ecification Tests
Likelihood ratio tests  were conducted to compare  models  1  and 2  against model  3.
Model  3  is the  unrestricted model  and  models  1  and  2  impose parameter restrictions.  The
first test included models  I  and 3.   We test the null hypothesis that the restrictions are equal
to zero. In the LR test of models  1  and 3  for food trade, the LR statistic is -1532. Since this
calculated  value  in  absolute  terms  is  greater  than  the  chi-square  value  at  13  degrees  of
freedom,   we   reject  the   null   hypothesis   in   favor  of  the   alternative.   Another  test   was
conducted to compare models 2 and 3  for food trade. The computed LR statistic is -9104,
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Table  5.  Estimated  Coefficients  of the  Models  for  Household  Food  Products  (t-statistics  in
old)
Model  I Model 2 Model 3
Constant -7 3625 -8  6578 -7  5936
-14.19 -17.79 -13.59
Cont,g 11175 I  3384 1,  1679
10.18 12.35 10.61
comlang_off 0 90 I 9 0  7993 " OJ95 I
13.03 1 I .52 I  I.OS
col45 I   7188 - I '6737 +++ 18210
10.74 10.66 I 1 .33
Dlstwces -12062 *** -0  8869 - -10845
-38.73 -29.07 -3 I .92
O_CIDPcapita I.0399 - I   0564 I   03 I  I
27.87 36.30 27.64
O_Pop 0,7909 0`7889 0  7877
46.84 50.45 46.76
0  GDPRatio 0 4568 0 2935 0 4690
5.09 3.54 5.21
0   F`actor -0 0026 -010015 -0,0022
-I.36 - I .3 I -I.17
D_GDPcaplta 0  7710 0  7536 ." 0 7722
28.06 30.45 28.19
D_pop 0  5555 " 0  5135 " 0  5531
38.3 40.41 38.18
D   GDPRatio 012938 0'3857 0'2954
4.46 6.00 4.49
D   Factor 0 0004 0 0058 0 0006
0.16 3.97 0.26
0WTO 0.9435 0 2908
I 0.0 I I.32
0  NAFTA 0  283 I 0 2228
I.87 I.45
0EU 0.2176 " 01549 *
2.94 I.96
0   MERCOSUR 2'0055 - I  9392 -
19.72 18.8
0  CARICOM 01086 -0 5364
0.57 -2.46
0  CAC`M 0  61  53 " 0 4353
3.7 2.51
0   ANDEAN I  0477 0'9682
®.,-\- 8J7
()   ASEAN 0.9920 " 0 9266
I 0. I 4 9J]
0  SPARTECA 2.9243 - 2  7788
16.39 14.64
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Table 5. (continued)
Model  I Model 2 Model 3
0  PA.fcRA -I  6089 - -1'6113
-5.21 -5.17
0  COMESA 0 3399 •" 01701
2.65 I.28
0  SAFTA 0 6965 0'6383
4.83 4J9
0   (jAFTA 0`  I   I   I   I 0 0556
I.19 0.56
DWTO 0 2083 -0  5188 *
3.18 -2.29
D   NAFTA 0'5443 0.5076
2.49 2J
DEU 01444 0 0693
I.93 0.82
D   MER(`OSUR -12017 -12402
-7.88 -7.89
D   CARICOM 0 2792 -0 0 I 92
2.77 -0.19
D  CACM -0  4195 -0 6026
-2.86 -3.99
D   ANDEAN -018922 " -0 9886
-5.74 -6.16
D  ASEAN -01517 -0 2' 54 *
- I .27 -I.75
D   SPARTECA 0 4426 0  3014 i
-.`® I.80
D   P^TCRA 0 3276 0.3487
I.05 I.11
D  COMESA -0.2457 -0 4076
-2.23 -3.55
D   SAFTA -0 3404 -0 3905
-2.26 -2.56
D   GAI.`lA 0 2408 01831 *
2.6S I.90
WTO O*D 0 4660 0  7811
8.19 3.35
N^FTA O+D I  3970 I  0539
3J3 2.70
EU  O*D 0  6168 0 4023
t,.W 3.75
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Table 5. (continued)
Model  I Model 2 Model 3
MERCOSUR O*D 0.4966 -0-1559
I.21 -0.33
CARICOM  O*D 2  2715 2  7896
9.45 8.68
CACM  ()*D 2  5252 2  5235
10.51 7.84
ANDEAN  O*D I  2033 I  .3071
4.53 4.13
ASEAN  O*D 0 8407 * 0 0476
I.87 0.10
SPARTECA O*D 3  '985 " 07118
I 0.43 2.09
PATCRA O*D -I `5776 - -0.8729
-4.68 - I .97
COMESA O*D I  4845 •" I   7332
4.61 4.92
SAFTA O*D 0 7783 0.4741
0.93 0.55
GAFTA O*D 0 6665 0  5759 *
33' 2.48
Number or Obs. 10957 10957 I 09S7
Adj Listed  R2 0.4644 0.4297 0.4709
***,  ** and  *  denote significance at the  I , 5  aiid  10 percent levels.
which exceeds the chi-square value at 26 degrees of freedom. We reject the null hypothesis
that the restrictions  are  equal to  zero,  indicating that model  3  is  superior to  both models  1
and 2 for food trade.
Determinants of Trade Flows
Many of the impacts affecting trade in agricultural  intermediate goods have similar
effects on food trade.   The estimated coefficient on contiguity is statistically significant and
has  a  positive  sign,  indicating  that  countries  sharing  a  border  will  trade  more  with  each
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other. Contiguity increases food trade by  1.17 percent. Countries sharing a common official
language  will  trade  up  to  .80  percent  more  than  those  not  sharing  a  common  offlcial
language.  The Col45  variable has a positive  sign and is  statistically  significant,  indicating
that  there  will  be  more  trade  between  countries  that  were  in  a  colonial  relationship  after
1945.  As expected, the coefficient on distance is statistically significant and has a negative
sign indicating that as the distance between two countries increase, trade volume decreases
since increased distance implies increased transportation costs.
The  estimated  coefficients  of  GDP  per  capita  for  both  exporting  and  importing
countries  are  statistically  significant  and  have  positive  signs,  indicating  that  an  origin  or
exporting  country  with  a  higher  income  exports  more.  Importing  countries  with  higher
incomes   will   have  more   purchasing  power   and   will   consume  and   import   more.   The
estimated coefficients on population for exporters and importers are statistically significant
and carry positive signs, indicating a positive relationship between population and trade.
Effects of Individual Trading Blocs
Similar  to  results  from  intermediate  agricultural  goods  trade,  many  of the  trade
agreements   included   in  the   food  trade   model   are  trade   enhancing   for  members.   The
estimated  coefficient  for  the  WTO  variable  for  exporting  countries  is  not  statistically
significant  indicating that the  origin's  membership  in  WTO  does  not  significantly  impact
export trade in this sector.  The  coefficient on the  WTO variable for importing countries  is
statistically significant and has a negative sign.  While WTO has not impacted export trade
to  non-members,  it  has  reduced  food  imports  from  the  rest  of the  world.  The  dummy
variable   representing  joint   membership   in   WTO   is   statically   significant   and  positive
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indicating  that  WTO  membership  has  enhanced  intra-bloc  food  trade.  Those  countries  in
WTO experience increased trade volume of food products within the arrangement.
The   estimated   coefficient  on  the   variable  NAFTA   for  origin  countries   is   not
statistically signiflcant. The NAFTA variable for destination countries has a coefficient that
is   statistically   significant   at   the   five   percent   level   and   has   a   positive   sign.   While
membership in NAFTA has increased food imports from the rest of the world, membership
has  no  signiflcant  effect  on  exports  to  non-members.  The  estimated  coefficient  on joint
NAFTA  membership  is  statistically  significant  and  positive  indicating  that  NAFTA  has
enhanced trade among its members in the food sector.
The  dummy  variable  representing  EU  membership  for  the  food  exporting  country  has  a
statistically   significant   coefficient   that   carries   a   positive    sign   indicating   that   EU
membership has increased food trade for its exporting members.  The estimated coefficient
on  the  EU  variable  for  destination  countries  is  not  sta,tistically  significant  indicating  that
EU has not significant affected import trade from non-members.  The coefficient on the EU
dummy  variable  is  statistically  significant  and  positive  indicating  enhanced  food  trade
among EU members.
The   estimated  coefficient  on  the  variable  MERCOSUR  for  origin  countries   is
statistically   significant   and   positive   indicating   that   membership   in   MERCOSUR   has
increased food exports to  the  rest of the world.  In contrast, the coefficient on the variable
MERCOSUR  for  destination  countries  is  statistically  significant  and  has  a  negative  sign
indicating  that  food  imports  have  been  impeded  by  MERCOSUR  membership.   Yeats
(1998)  cites  that  MERCOSUR's  discriminatory  tariffs  against non-members  have  lead  to
substantial  trade  diversion  in  the  arrangement.  The  high  tariffs  imposed  on  food  goods
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from  non-members   will   substantially  reduce   imports  from  these   countries   and  hence
membership  in  MERCOSUR  will  have  a  negative  correlation  with  imports  from  non-
members.   The   coefficient   on  joint   membership   in   MERCOSUR   is   not   statistically
significant,  implying  that  MERCOSUR  has  not  affected  intra-bloc  trading  in  the  food
sector.
In the case of CARICOM membership, the estimated coefficient on the variable for
exporters is statistically  significant and negative while the coefficient for importers  is   not
statistically  significant.  This  indicates  that  membership  in  CARICOM  reduces  exports  to
the rest of the world but has not affected imports from the rest of the world. The coefficient
on the dummy variable for joint membership in CARICOM is statistically significant at the
I  percent level  and has a positive  sign.  This indicates that CARICOM has  improved trade
activities among member countries in the food sector.
The  estimated coefficient on membership  in  CACM  is  statistically  significant  and
positive for exporters and statistically significant and negative for importers indicating that
while  exporters  in  CACM  have  seen  increased  food trade  to the  outside  world,  importers
did not. The dummy variable forjoint membership in CACM is statistically significant and
has  a  positive  sign  indicating  that  CACM  have  improved  intra-bloc  trade  for  in  the  food
industry.
The ANDEAN community has a statistically significant and positive coefficient for
exporters  but  the  coefficient  for  importers  is  statistically  significant  and  negative.  This
indicates  that  membership  in  the  ANDEAN  community  has  reduced  food  imports  for
members.  The  estimated  coefficient on joint membership  in the ANDEAN  community is
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statistically significant and positive indicating that this trade agreement has enhanced food
trade amongst member nations.
The  coefficient  on  the  dummy  variable  representing  membership  in  ASEAN  is
statistically  significant  and positive  for exporting  countries.  The  coefficient  for  importing
countries  is  negative  and  statistically  significant  at  the   10  percent  level.   This  signifies
improvement in extra-export trade but deterioration in imports from non-members.  While
ASEAN  has  improved  export trade with the rest  of the  world,  it had  no  impact on  intra-
bloc food trade.
The  coefficient on the  dummy  variables  representing  SPARTECA  membership  is
statistically   significant   and   positive   for   exporters   and   importers.   The   coefficient   for
SPARTECA  membership  is  much  higher  for  exporters  indicating  that  even  though  both
importers  and  exporters  benefit  from  SPARTECA  membership,  membership  has  had  a
greater   impact   on   food   exports.   The   estimated   coefficient   on  joint   membership   in
SPARTECA is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and positive indicating that this
trade agreement has also enhanced food trade among members.
The   estimated   coefficient   on   PATCRA   membership   for   origin   countries   is
statistically  significant  and  has  a  negative  sign  indicating  food  exporters  in  PATCRA
export less to the rest of the world.  The estimated coefficient for importers  in PATCRA  is
not  statistically  significant.  The  estimated  coefficient  on  joint  PATCRA  membership  is
statistically   significant   at   the   5   percent   level   and   negative   indicating   that   PATCRA
membership impedes intra-bloc food trade.
The  coefficients  of dummy  variables  representing  COMESA  membership  is  not
statistically   signiflcant   for   exporters   but   is   statistically   significant   and   negative   for
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importers  indicating that  COMESA has not affected exports  outside of the  region but has
reduced  imports  from  non-members.  The  estimated  coefficient  on the  COMESA  variable
for  joint  membership  is  statistically  significant  and  positive   indicating  that  COMESA
membership enhances food trade within the bloc.
Memberships   in   SAFTA   have   similar   results   to   that   of  MERCOSUR.   The
coefficient  of  dummy  variables  representing  membership  is  statistically  significant  and
positive for exporters and statistically significant and negative for importers. This indicates
that while food exporters trade more with non-members, food importers trade less with the
rest  of  the  world.   While  the  coefficient  on  the  SAFTA  variable  for  joint  inclusion  is
positive, it is not statistically significant indicating that SAFTA has not affected intra-bloc
food trade.
While the estimated coefficient on GAFTA membership for exporters is positive, it
is   not   statistically   significant.   However.   the   coefficient   for  importers   is   positive   and
statistically  significant  at the  10  percent  level  indicating that  membership  in  GAFTA  has
enhanced food imports from the rest of the world for its member countries.  The estimated
coefficient on joint membership in GAFTA  is statistically significant at the 5  percent level
and positive indicating that GAFTA has enhanced food trade amongst members.
Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
Similar  hypothesis  testing  conducted  in  the  agricultural  trade  model  was  used  to
determine if an arrangement lead to trade creation or trade diversion in the food sector. The
test  involved  calculating  the  sum  of the  coefficients  on  exports  to  and  imports  from  non-
members.   We  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  sum  of  coefficients  is  not  statistically
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different from zero„ i.e.  the null hypothesis assumes no effect on food trade.  Results of the
hypothesis test for food trade are reported in Table 6.
Table 6. Hy|)othesis test of Trade Creation/Diversion Effects of Membership in   an MTA for
Food Trade
Equation Coefficient T-Stat Wald
0  WTO+D  WTO -0.2279 -0.53 0.28
0  NAFTA + D  NAFTA 0.7304 2.67 7.11
0  EU + D  EU 0.2242 I.80 3.24
0   MERCOSUR + D  MERCOSUR 0.6990 3.61 13.03
0  CARICOM + D  CARICOM -0.5556 •2.29 5.25
0  CACM + D  CACM -0.1673 -0.73 0.53
0  ANDEAN + D  ANDEAN -0.0204 -0 . I 0 0.01
0  ASEAN + D  ASEAN 0.7112 4.36 I 8.98
0  SPARTECA + D  SPARTECA 3.0802 1  I.75 I 38.18
0  PATCRA + D   PATCRA -1 .2626 -2.82 7.92
0  COMESA + D  COMESA -0.2374 -1.31 1.72
0  SAFTA + D  SAFTA 0.2478 I.L6 I.35
0  GAFTA + D  GAFTA 0.2387 1.67 2.73
The  results  of the  hypothesis  test  for  food  trade  vary  from  the  agricultural  trade
results in certain instances.   Eight of the thirteen agreements are found to have statistically
significant effects on food trade creation or diversion.
The coefficients on WTO, CACM, ANDEAN Pact, COMESA and SAFTA are not
statistically significant,  so we fail to reject the null  hypothesis that these arrangements had
no  effect on  food trade  creation or diversion with non-member countries.  Results  indicate
that   CARICOM   and   PATCRA   were   trade   diverting.   We   reject   the   hypothesis   that
membership  in NAFTA;  MERCOSUR;  ASEAN;  SPARTECA  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the
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EU  and  GAFTA  had  no  effect  on  trade  with  non-members.  but  rather  tended  to  create
additional  food  trade  with  countries  outside  the  MTAs.  These  arrangements  have  opened
their markets to global imports and have expanded exports to the rest of the world.  Results
of the overall effect of the MTA's on food trade are listed in Table 7.
Table 7. Overall Effect of Individual MTA on Food Trade
0  Assn D   Assn O*D Assn 0  Assn + I)  Assn
WTO + - ** + ***
NAFTA + + ** + *** + ***
EU + ** + + *** + *
MERCOSUR + *** - *** - + ***
CARICOM ** - + *** - **
CACM + ** - *** + *** -
ANDEAN + *** - *** + *** -
ASEAN + *** * + + ***
SPARTECA + *** + * + ++ + ***
PATCRA - +++ + - ** - ***
COMESA + - *** + ** -
SAFTA + *** ** + +
GAFTA + + * + ** + *
***,  ** and  * denote significance at the  I,  5  and  10 percent levels.
+ denotes a positive sign on the coefficient and -denotes a negative sign  on the coefficient.
69
cHAPTnR 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
Trade  liberalization is  a major issue for many countries throughout the world.  The
expansion  of global  markets  presents  remarkable  challenges  for  many  nations.  It  is  thus
imperative that studies evaluate factors that enhance and distort trade between countries.  In
this  study,  we  estimated  several  models  of trade  involving  183  countries  and  13  trading
blocs,  using  data  for  2004  or  appropriate  proxies.  Variables  representing  income,  market
size,  distance,  colonial  relationship,  cultural  affinity,  contiguity  and  membership  in  an
economic trade arrangement were all included in the estimation.
The main objective of the study was to evaluate the impact of trade policies, trading
costs, trade  agreements and other economic and demographic characteristics on exports of
food   and   agriculture   products.   Specifically,   the   paper   examined   the   effects   of  trade
agreements  on  countries  and/or  regions.  The  13  trading  blocs  included  in  this  study  are
located  in  different  regions  of the  world.  These  are  WTO,  NAFTA,  EU,  MERCOSUR,
CARICOM,  CACM,  the  ANDEAN  Pact,  ASEAN,  SPARTECA.  PATCRA,  COMESA,
SAFTA and GAFTA.
A modified gravity-type model  is used in this study.  In the typical  gravity model of
trade,   the   dependent   variable,   bilateral   trade   between   country   pairs,   is   explained   by
variables  representing  income  and  market  size  in  both  origin  and  destination  countries.
Other dummy  variables  represent contiguity,  common language  and  colonial  relationship.
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The  model  in  this  study  included  several  dummy  variables  representing trade  association
membership. There were dummy variables representing exports from members of MTAs to
non-members  and  imports  to  MTA  members  from  non-members.  An  additional  set  of
dummy variables  indicated  if both parties to  the trade were  members  of the  same  MTA.
This  definition  of trade  relationships  allowed  us  to  capture  the  effects  of the  MTAs  on
intra-bloc trade and trade with the rest of the world.
The   estimated   coefficients   of  variables   such   as   contiguity,   common   offlcial
language,  colonial  link,  GDP  per  capita,  population,  the  ratio  of  agricultural  GDP  per
capita  to  GDP  per  capita,  and  the  ratio  of arable  land  to  agrioultural  labor  effectively
explain   agricultural   and   food   trade   flows.   The   coefficients   on  these   variables  are   as
expected and are in line with results of previous studies,
Estimates on the effect of the  13 trade agreements varied considerably across blocs.
Membership  in  several  MTAs  was  found  to  enhance  intra-bloc  trading  at  the  expense  of
non-members,  while  membership  in  others  has  successfully  increased  both  intra-bloc  and
trade with the rest of the world.  There are also arrangements that had no  significant effect
on trading among members and those that have effectively reduced trade for members with
the rest of the world.
Conclusions
WTO has increased intra-bloc trade in agriculture and food but has diverted trade in
the   agricultural   sector.   CARICOM   significantly   enhanced   agricultural   and   food  trade
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amongst members but diverted food trade. NAFTA, EU and SPARTECA have consistently
been found to increase intra-bloc agricultural and food trade and were all found to be trade
creating in both sectors.  CACM and the ANDEAN community have been trade creating in
the agricultural  sector but have had no  significant trade creating or diverting effect in the
food  sector.  MERCOSUR and ASEAN  have  been trade  creating  in both  agricultural  and
food  trade.  SAFTA  has  diverted  trade  in  the  agricultural  sector  while  COMESA  created
trade  in this  sector.  GAFTA has been trade  creating  in the  food  sector.  PATCRA  showed
signs of trade diversion in both agricultural and food trade.
In summary, profits or gains from trade will be dependent on the revenues and costs
associated   with   the   exchange.    We   have   found   that   income,   market   size,   cultural
relationship  and  geographical  proximity  all   significantly  affect  bilateral  trade  between
countries.   Both   geographic   and   cultural   distances   are   important   considerations   when
nations  choose  trade  partners.  In  addition,  we  have  found  that  MTAs  have  contributed
signiflcantly to trade amongst nations.
Need for Further Study
Although  this  study  includes  several  variables  representing  economic  integration,
there  are  other  variables  not  included  that  are  important  factors  affecting  bilateral  trade.
Tariff rates,  foreign  direct  investment  and  the  impact  of multinational  corporations  may
affect the  choice  of trade partners and the  level  of trade occulTing between two  countries.
An expanded model including these variables, along with other variables such as exchange
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rates,   can   be   developed   to   determine   the   effects   of  taxation,   international   capital
movements and foreign exchange on trade flows.
Further   studies   can   also   assess   the   nature   of  multilateral   and   bilateral   trade
agreements  with  the  aim  to  identifying  policies  that  are  protectionist  instead  of  trade
liberalizing.  Although trade  agreements  can be  trade  creating or trade  diverting,  there  are
policies that can reduce the potential for trade diversion. Further studies can analyze policy
instruments  in place  that  may  encourage  trade  diversion  and  attempt to  develop  solutions
that will promote policies also geared at improving trade with the rest of the world.
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APPENDIX A
SAS PROCEDulu INPUT FILES
proc import out]vork.tradel
data file = "C:\Documents and Settings\Student\My I)ocuments\IIH_Data(2).xls"
DBMS=Excel Replace:
Run;
proc import out=work.trade2
data file = "C:\Documents and Settings\Student\My Documents\IND_Data(2).xls"
DBMS=Excel Replace;
Run;
Proc Model data=tradel ;
Parms 80 8182 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 810 811812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819
820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 B36 837 838
839 840 841842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851;
LNHHTRAI)E = 80 + B1*contig + 82*comlang_off + 83*col45 + 84*distwces +
85*0  GDPcapita + 86*O_POP + 87*0  GDPRatio + 88*0  Factor +
B9*D_GDPcapita + B10*D_POP + 811 *D_GDPRatio + 812= D_Factor +
813*0  WTO + 814*0  NAFTA + 815*0  HU + 816*0  MERCOSUR +
817*0-CARICOM + 8-18*0  CACM + Bi9*O  ANDEA-N + 820*0  ASEAN +
821*0-SPARTECA + 822*0-PATCRA + 823-*0  COMESA +824=0  SAFTA +
825*0-GAFTA + 826*1)  WT-O + 827*D  NAFTA-+ 828*D  EU +
829*D-MERcOsuR + 83O*D  cARlcoivl + 83i*D  cAcri + 832*D  ANDEAN +
833*D-ASEAN +834*D  SPAffTECA + 835*D  PAT-CRA + 836*D  C6MHSA +
837*D-SAFTA + 838*D-GAFTA +839*WTO -0  D + 840*NAFTA-0  D +
841*Eb  0  D + 842*ME-RCOSUR  0  D + 843-*C-ARICOM  0  D +
844*CAtM-0  D + 845*ANDEAN-O-D + 846*ASHAN  0 -D I
847*spART-Ec-A  0  D + 848*pATtin  0  1] + 849*cO-MESA  0  D
+850*SAFTA_0_-DI851*GAFTA_0_D;
fit LnHHTradeAICCME= 1 ;
Test 813+826;
tEST 814+827;
TEST 815+828;
TEST 816+829;
TEST 817+830;
TEST 818+831;
TEST 819+832;
TnsT 820+833;
TEST 821+834;
TEST 822+83S;
TnsT 823+836;
TEST 824+837;
TEST 825+838;
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Run;
Proc Model data=trade2;
Parms 80 8182 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 810 811812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819
B20 821 822 823 824 825 826 B27 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838
839 840 841842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851;
LNINDTRADE = 80 + 81 *contig + 82*comlang_off + 83*col45 + 84*distwces +
85*0_GDPcapita + 86*O_POP + 87*O_GDPRatio + B8*0_Factor +
B9*D_GDPcapita + B10*D  POP + B11*D  GDPRatio + 812* D_Factor +
813*0  WTO + 814*0  NAFTA + 815*0  EU + 816*0  MERCOSUR +
817*O-CARICOM + 8-18*0  CACM + 819*0  ANDEA-N + 820*0  ASEAN +
82i*o-spARTncA + 822*o-PATCRA + 823-*o  COMESA +824=o  SAFTA +
825*O-GAFTA + 826*D  WT-O + 827*1)  NAFTA-+ 828*D  HU +
829*D-MERcOsuR + 83O*D  cARIcoin + 83i*D  cAcivi + 832*D  ANDEAN +
833*D-ASEAN +834*D  SPAR-TECA + 83S*I)  PAT-CRA + 836*1)  C6MHSA +
837*D-SAFTA + 838*D-GAFTA +839*WTO -0  D + 840*NAFTA-0  D +
841*Eb  0  D + 842*ME-RCOSUR  0  D + 843-*C-ARICOM  0  D +
844*CA-CM-0  D + 845*ANDEAN-0-I) + 846*ASEAN  O-D I
847*spART-Ec-A  0  D + 848*pAT€Iin  0  D + 849*cO-MESA  0  D
+850*SAFTA_O_-D=851*GAFTA_0_D;
fit LnlNDTradefflccME= 1 :
Test 813+826;
tEST 814+827;
TEST 815+828;
TEST 816+829;
TEST 817+830;
TEST 818+831;
TEST 819+832;
TEST 820+833;
TEST 821+834;
TEST 822+835;
TEST 823+836;
TEST 824+837;
TEST 825+838;
Run;
Proc Model data=trade2;
Parms 80 8182 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 810 811812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819
820 821 822 823 B24 825 826 827 B28 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838
839 840 841842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851;
LNINDTRADE = 80 + 81 *contig + 82*comlang_off + 83*col45 + 84*distwces +
85*O_GDPcapita + 86*0  POP + 87*0_GDPRatio + B8*0_Factor +
B9*D_GDPcapita + B10*D-POP + B11*D_GDPRatio + 812* D  Factor +
813*0  WTO + 814*0  NAFTA + 815*0  EU + 816*0  MHRC6SUR +
817*O-CARICOM + 8-18*0  CACM + 819*0  ANDEA-N + 820*0  ASEAN +
821 *O-SPARTECA + 822*0-  PATCRA + 823-*0  COMESA +824=0  SAFTA +
81
825*0  GAFTA + 826*D  WTO + 827*D  NAFTA + 828*D  EU +
829*D-MERcOsuR + 83O*D  cARIcori + 83i*I]  cAcri + 832*D  ANDEAN +
833*D-ASEAN +834*D  SPAkTECA + 835*D  PAT-CRA + 836*D  C6MHSA +
837*D-SAFTA + 838*D-GAFTA +839*WTO -0  D + 840*NAFTA-0  D +
84l*Eb  0  D + 842*ME-RCOSUR  0  I) + 843-*C-ARICOM  0  D +
844*CAtM~  0  D + 845*ANDHAN-O-D + 846*ASEAN  O-D i
847*spART-Ec-A  0  D + 848*pAT€in  0  D + 849*cO-MESA  0  D
+850*SAFTA_O_-D=851*GAFTA_O_D;
fitLnlNDTradeAICCME=1;
Restrict 813+826;
Run;
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APPENDIX 8
SAS INPUT FILES FOR COLLINEARITY TESTING
Proc Import Out=work.trade2
Datafile="C:u)ocuments and Settings\Student\My DocumentsuND_data(2).xls"
DBMS=Excel Replace;
Run;
Proc Means;
Proc Corr;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 8] 82;
LNINI)TRADE=BO + 81 *O_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita;
ritLnlNDTradeAICCME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2 ;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84;
LNINDTRADE=BO + B1*0_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*0  Factor +
84*D_Factor;
fit LnlNDTradefflccME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=tradc2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84 85 86;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81 *O_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*O_Factor +
84*D_Factor +85*0_FDI + 86*D_FDI;
fitLnlNDTradefflccME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms B0 81 82 83 84 85 86;
LNINDTRAI)E=BO + 81 *O_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*0_Factor +
84*D_Factor + 85*0_POP + 86*D_POP;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCME=O;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81*0  TOTGDP + 82*D_TOTGDP;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCME=0;
Run;
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Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 8182 83 84;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81*0  TOTGDP + 82*D  TOTGI)P + 83*0  Factor +
84*D_Factor;
rit LnlNDTradefflccME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84 85 86;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81*0  TOTGDP + 82*D  TOTGDP + 83*0  Factor +
84*D_ Factor + 85*O_FDI +-86*D_FDI;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81*0  TOTGI}P + 82*D  TOTGDP;
fltLnlNDTradefflccME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81*0  TOTGDP + 82*D  TOTGDP + 83*0  POP +
84*D_POP;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84 85 86;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81*0  TOTGDP + 82*D  TOTGI)P + 83*0  POP +
84*D_POP+85*0_FACTO-R+86*D_Factor;
fit LnlNDTrade/HCCMH=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88;
LNINI)TRADE=BO + 81*0  TOTGDP + 82*D  TOTGDP + 83*0  POP +
84*D_POP + 85*0_ FACTO-R + 86*D_Factor I 87*0  FDI + B8*D_FDI;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCMn=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81*0  GDPcapita + 82*D  GDPcapita;
rit LnlNDTradeAICCME=0;
84
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81 *0_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*0_POP +
84*D  POP;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCMH=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84 85 86;
LNINDTRADE=BO + Bl*0_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*O_POP +
84*D_POP + 85*0. Factor + 86*I}_Factor;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88;
LNINDTRADE=BO + B1*O_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*0  POP +
84*D_POP + 85*0_Factor + 86*D_Factor + 87*O_FDI + B8*D_FDI;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2:
Parms 80 81 82;
LNINDTRADH=BO + 81*0  GDPcapita + 82*D  GDPcapita;
fit LnlNDTrademccME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84;
LNINDTRADE=BO + B1*O_GI)Pcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*0_POP +
84*D _POP;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84 85 86;
LNINDTRADE=BO + 81 *O_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*0_POP +
84*D_POP + 85*0 _Land + 86*D_Land;
fit LnlNDTradeAICCME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 8182 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 810;
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LNINDTRADE=BO + B1*O_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*O_POP +
84*D_POP + 85*0_land + 86*D_Land + 87*O_AgLabor + B8*D_AgLabor +
B9*0_FDI + B10*D_FDI;
fit LnlNDTradefflccME=0;
Run;
Proc model data=trade2;
Parms 80 81 82 83 84 85 86;
LNINDTRADE=BO + B1*O_GDPcapita + 82*D_GDPcapita + 83*0_POP +
84*D_POP + 85*O_Factor + 86*D  Factor/ tol vif collin:
Run;
fit LnlNDTradefflccME=0;
Run;
Proc reg data=trade2;
Model LNINDTRADE = 0_GDPcapita D_GDPcapita O_POP D_POP 0_Factor
D_Factor/to] vif collin;
Run;
Proc reg data=trade2;
Model LNINDTRADH = O_GDPcapita I)_GDPcapita O_POP D_POP 0_Factor
D _Factor 0  FDI D  FDI/tol vif collin;
Run;
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